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Most businesses and millions of individual consumers purchase insurance
as protection against a variety of risks associated with life and property-
threatening events, such as accidents, severe weather, earthquakes, diseases,
and traffic mishaps.' Also, thousands of consumers purchase pension plans
1. See ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE: MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
LEGAL DOCTRINES AND REGULATORY ACTS 1 (1989) [hereinafter WIDISS] ("[Il]iability insur-
ance is purchased by most businesses to transfer at least some portion of the risks associated
with the fabrication, distribution, and use of manufactured or processed products").
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and nursing-home coverage as safeguards against risks associated with old
age.2 Simply expressed, the two trillion dollar3 American insurance industry
is enormous.
Unfortunately, consumers are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
services and products that the insurance industry provides.4 Correspond-
ingly, they are filing an ever-increasing number of lawsuits' against insurers
in state courts-"the workhorse of the nation's courts." 6 While courts have
ruled equally in favor of insurers7 and policyholders, advocates for both con-
sumers and the insurance industry strongly believe "judicial bias" or "judi-
cial hostility" permeates state supreme courts.
Some U.S. Supreme Court Justices have argued that state supreme courts
are hostile towards insurance carriers.8 Commentators also have viciously
2. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Insurance Industry Pitfalls Can Be Avoided With Care: Con-
sumers Should Check Out Ratings of Companies, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1991, at H3; see also
Soi S. Fine, Voice of the People - Medicap Ills, CHL TRIn., July 23, 1990, at 10 ("Nearly 23
million older Americans spend $15 billion every year on premiums for private Medicare sup-
plemental health insurance known as Medigap policies... to protect themselves against health
care costs and to protect their savings.").
3. See Paulette Thomas, Powerful Insurance Lobby is Being Fragmented Just When It
Needs to Put a Premium on Unity, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1991, at AI6; see also William B.
Crawford Jr., CBOT Submits Insurance Products to CFTC, CHi. TRIB., June 27, 1990, at 3
(stating that each year, the industry collects "approximately $400 billion in premiums").
4. See, e.g., Insurance Industry Target in Rising Spate of Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 30,
1989, at 9 ("Americans... are increasingly turning to the courts to settle disputes of all types.
And lawyers say there is a growing realization that the insurance industry has vast financial
resources that can be tapped.... Also, there is anger in many quarters toward the industry.").
5. Id.
Not only has the number of normal claims-related lawsuits increased, but the indus-
try itself is embroiled in high-stakes legal battles that pit it against the government
and private industry .... For example[,] [i]nsurance companies have been sued by
more than 200 manufacturers . . . over who will pay the bill for cleaning up
America's toxic waste sites.... A sweeping antitrust lawsuit [was] filed by 19 state
attorney generals, accusing leading insurers of conspiring to restrict liability coverage
for businesses and municipalities .... [And] [t]he Department of Justice has sued
three leading insurers .... claiming that Medicare erroneously paid millions of dol-
lars in claims that the three companies should have covered.
Id.
6. Amy D. Marcus & Arthur S. Hayes, Filings of State Tort Suits Jumped in '89, WALL
ST. J., May 7, 1991, at B8. The National Center for State Courts found that "[n]early 100
million new cases were added to the dockets of the nation's state court system in 1989." More
important, the National Center's court statistics also revealed a sharp increase in the number
of tort suits filed in state courts. Id.
7. See supra note 4, at 9.
8. Arguments appearing in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), illustrate
the view that state supreme courts are anti-insurer. In Lavoie, Aetna Life claimed that Justice
Embry and "all the other justices of the Alabama Supreme Court" were personally biased
against the company. Id. at 825. In particular, Aetna accused Justice Embry of exhibiting
general hostility towards, and general frustration with, all insurance companies. Id. at 818,
1992]
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criticized state supreme courts for being biased against insurance carriers.'
820. The United States Supreme Court found no general bias or hostility toward Aetna Life.
The Court did find, however, that Justice Embry's participation and pecuniary interest in a
similar Alabama lawsuit violated Aetna's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 822, 824 ("At the time Justice Embry cast the deciding vote and authored
the court's opinion, he had pending at least one very similar bad-faith-refusal-to-pay lawsuit
against Blue Cross in another Alabama court .... Thus, Justice Embry's opinion for the Ala-
bama Supreme Court has the clear and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and
the settlement value of his own case.").
Most state courts, however, are reluctant to find a substantive due process violation. See
Ware v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 577 A.2d 902, 905 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that
to prove that a trial judge's bias or impartiality violated a consumer's due process rights, "[a]
party seeking recusal must assert specific grounds in support of the recusal motion ... [and]
may not raise the issue of judicial prejudice or bias for the first time in post trial proceedings");
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schlossberg, 570 A.2d 328, 334 (Md. App. 1990) ("No
timely request for recusal was made; therefore, an after-the-fact request for recusal was prop-
erly denied."); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 774 P.2d 1003, 1015 (Nev. 1989) (holding
that certain "procedural irregularities" were insufficient evidence to establish that former Chief
Justice Gunderson was biased and that his alleged impartiality violated the insurer's due pro-
cess rights); Violette v. Midwest Printing Co.-Webb Publishing, 415 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Minn.
1987) (finding "no denial of due process based on the judges' refusal to disqualify themselves");
Rosemond v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 316 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. App. 1984)
(holding that the trial judge's alleged expressions of bias did not violate the consumer's due
process rights).
But Justice O'Connor supports the view that state supreme courts are hostile toward insur-
ance carriers. In Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991), Justice O'Connor
wrote a stinging dissenting opinion in which she criticized the Alabama Supreme Court for
*'giv[ing] civil juries complete, unfettered, and unchanneled discretion to determine whether
... to impose punitive damages" against unpopular defendants like insurance companies. Id
at 1058. According to Justice O'Connor, Alabama's common-law, punitive-damages scheme
violates both procedural and substantive due process. Id. at 1056-57. "Unfortunately, Ala-
bama's punitive damages scheme is indistinguishable from the common-law schemes employed
by many States." Id. at 1056. The scheme "redistribute[s] wealth," id., and allows "individual
jurors to rely upon emotion, bias, and personal predilections of every sort." Id. at 1057; see
also, McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981) (arguing that the
" 'impositi[on] of tort liability on [insurance companies] alone for a breach of... duty which is
present in all contracts' is 'a denial of ... equal protection under both the United States and
Oklahoma Constitutions.'" (ommission in original). The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however,
refused to "address the equal-protection argument [because] it was not timely raised"). In
short, Justice O'Connor argued that Alabama's and other states' schemes for awarding puni-
tive damages are biased against insurance companies because offending carriers may receive
adverse judgments "as high as $10 million, $25 million, and $50 million." Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at
1058. But see McCorkle, 637 P.2d at 588 (accepting the view that an award of punitive dam-
ages for the bad-faith handling of a consumer's fire-loss claim does not deny procedural due
process for the insurance industry or unfairly protect consumer to the prejudice of the insur-
ance industry). The court in McCorkle justified its decision by noting: "[O]ne of the primary
reasons a consumer purchases any type of insurance (and the insurance industry knows this) is
the peace of mind and security that it provides in the event of loss." Id.
9. For example, one commentator accused "anti-insurer courts" of using a "pro-insurer
rule to achieve an anti-insurer result" in settlement cases. See Davis J. Howard, Apportioning
an Insurer's Liability Between Covered and Noncovered Parties and Claims, 38 FED'N INS. &
[Vol. 41:325
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The contrary view that state supreme courts are anti-consumer is also
widespread. "
CORP. COUNS. Q. 319, 340 (1988). Moreover, some jurists have criticized supreme courts for
indulging consumers. Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 261 N.W.2d 804, 808
(S.D. 1977) ("The insurance industry is a risk industry, operated on a supposedly sound actua-
rial basis.... We cannot expect the insurers to write their contracts in the language of chil-
dren's primers, 'see the dog run, run dog run' style."). Other courts take a more consumer-
oriented approach:
the reasonable-expectations doctrine does not automatically mandate either pro-in-
surer or pro-insured results. It does place a burden on insurance companies to com-
municate coverage and exclusions of policies accurately and clearly. It does require
that expectations of coverage by the insured be reasonable under the circumstances.
Neither of those requirements seems overly burdensome.
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985).
Still other commentators cite the length of various state-court opinions as evidence of judicial
bias and hostility toward insurance carriers. For example, some commentators accuse
supreme court judges of deliberately writing shorter and simpler anti-insurer decisions to re-
duce the precedential value of such rulings. See Kenneth F. Oettle and Davis J. Howard, D&O
Insurance: Judicially Transforming a "Duty to Pay" Policy into a "Duty to Defend" Policy, 22
TORT. & INS. L.J. 337 (1987). Oettle and Howard argue that pro-insurer decisions are:
short and simple and therefore less likely to be reported. By contrast, pro[-]insured
decisions ... tend to be long and complicated since the courts deciding them often
attempt to create an analytical framework capable of justifying coverage when the
language of the policy would seem to require otherwise .... [B]ecause [pro-insured
decisions] are long and complicated, these decisions [are more] likely to be reported
and ... obtain precedential value.
Id. at 346 n.25. See also Peter C. Haley and Brandt L. Wolkin, Bad Faith and the Financial
Institution Bond, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 719 (1990) [hereinafter Haley & Wolkin] ("because
the current judicial bias is unfavorable .... bonding companies must develop clear claims
investigations procedures .... These efforts will help negate claims by the insured about une-
qual bargaining power and lack of sophistication").
10. For example, in State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 1990),
Justice Sweeney wrote a strong dissenting opinion in which he criticized the majority for con-
struing ambiguous policy language "in favor of the insurer and against the insured." Id. at
960. According to Justice Sweeney, the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court is "decidedly
anti-consumer" and would rather protect the drafters of insurance contracts than protect con-
sumers. Id. at 959. He noted that:
[T]he majority resorts to judicial legislation in order to protect not consumers, but
drafters of insurance contracts .... The liberal construction rule of law has become
hollow indeed, since here the majority has acknowledged that it will rescue inartfully
drafted insurance contract language by imposing a presumption of non-recoverability
in favor of the insurer who falls prey to such nebulous drafting.
Id. at 962.
In addition, an analysis of California politics supports the proposition that state supreme
courts are anti-consumer.
In November 1988, [California] voters approved Proposition 103, which mandated a
[minimum] 20% rollback in their premiums . . . . But the [California] Supreme
Court eviscerated the law by ruling that insurers are entitled to a fair rate of return
on equity in their auto lines, later determined ...to be 11.2%. The rollbacks
wouldn't have allowed most insurers such a return.
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Are state supreme courts truly biased against the insurance industry? Or
are certain regional state supreme courts more likely to issue anti-consumer
opinions? Some consumer advocates, commentators, insurance carriers and
justices believe state supreme courts are inherently biased against or in favor
of insurers and policyholders. As of this writing, a systematic, empirical
investigation of "judicial bias"-involving state supreme courts, consumers
and the insurance industry-has not been undertaken.
While no universal, legal definition of "judicial bias" exists, it may be de-
fined in at least two different ways. First, "judicial bias" may be intentional,
which "is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one [litigant] over
another.""' Such bias is intentional discrimination, where a judge's personal
interests shape the outcome of a case. This discriminatory conduct is
grounds for disqualifying a state trial, appellate or supreme court judge. 2
The second type of "judicial bias" resembles disparate-impact discrimina-
tion."3 This is unintentional bias; 4 it occurs when immaterial factors such
Chip Johnson, A Legislative Free-for-All Rages as Californians Strive to Bring Down the Cost of
Auto Insurance, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1991, at A24. The insurance commissioner and other
groups are angry, because they believe "a fair return is a lot less than 11.2%." Id.
11. Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1979). See also, Pote v. State, 733 P.2d
1018 (Wyo. 1987). In Pote, the Wyoming Supreme Court elaborated the definition of inten-
tional bias it originally adopted in Cline, noting that "conditions must exist which reflect pre-
judgment of the case by the judge or a leaning of his mind in favor of one party to the extent
that his decision in the matter is based on grounds other than the evidence placed before him."
Id. at 1021.
12. Id. ("The 'bias' which is a ground for disqualification of a judge must be personal").
See also, supra note 8.
13. The United States Supreme Court established the "disparate impact" theory of dis-
crimination in a series of cases dealing with claims of employment discrimination. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Under the
Court's "disparate impact" analysis, a Title VII plaintiff may state a prima facie employment
discrimnation claim by making a statistical showing that the neutral scheme caused the hiring
disparity. See LEE M. MODJESKA, § 1.8 Employment Discrimination Law 30 (2d ed. 1988).
But in the context of the present discussion, a "disparate impact" analysis permits a presump-
tion, based on statistical showing, that a state supreme court's neutral rule, practice policy
harms members of a certain group, such as female policyholders, automobile insurers, life-
insurance insurers, or excess liability insurers.
14. See Jesse A. Witten, Disparate Impact Doctrine Revisited: Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 384-86 (1990). The author
notes:
Disparate impact and disparate treatment are the two main theories on which indi-
viduals or classes may base employment discrimination claims under Title VII.
Under the disparate treatment theory, the employee alleges that his employer has
intentionally discriminated against him because of his membership in a protected
class. By contrast, under the disparate impact theory, the employee alleges that a
facially neutral practice.., has had a disproportionately adverse effect on members
of a protected class and is discriminatory.
[Vol. 41:325
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as region of country, type of insurance contract, an insurer's state of incor-
poration or race of the insured unwittingly determine the outcome of judicial
decisions. Stated differently, disparate-impact discrimination occurs when
extralegal factors-those having little to do with the merits of a case-regu-
larly and systematically influence state supreme court's decisions in favor of
either the insurer or the policyholder. Such rulings are inherently biased
because facially neutral, extralegal variables, rather than material evidence
and legal principles, determine the disposition of lawsuits.
This Article focuses on the second type of "judicial bias"-disparate-im-
pact discrimination. The Article examines whether state supreme courts are
permitting extralegal factors to influence the disposition of suits involving
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of con-
tract, tort of bad faith, and excess liability (excess judgment). An empirical
analysis of state supreme court cases decided between 1900-91 was con-
ducted to determine whether "judicial bias" exists.
Part I of the Article briefly describes four theories of recovery. In particu-
lar, the Article examines the rules of contract (express) law; the theory of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; the theory of an independent
tort of bad faith; and the theory of excess liability (excess judgment). Part II
surveys various theories of recovery among first-party suits. Part II then
discusses the conflicting state supreme court rulings that imply that state
tribunals favor one litigant over another. Part III analyzes third-party suits
and discusses various inconsistent bad-faith and excess-liability decisions.
Finally, Part IV discusses a disparate-impact analysis. The Article con-
cludes that state supreme courts are unwittingly discriminating against liti-
gants. Specifically, these supreme tribunals allow extralegal factors, which
have little to do with the merits of the suits, to influence the disposition of
insurance-related cases. More to the point, the Article encourages policy-
holders and insurance companies to settle their disputes in a state adminis-
trative forum. Trial by judge or by jury should be avoided and judicial
review of any kind should be prevented.
Id. at 385 (footnotes omitted). See also Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs:
Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1328-38 (1990) (outlining
the significant differences between "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" and noting
that "questions of motivation" are excluded from the disparate-impact analysis).
19921
Catholic University Law Review
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF RECOVERY IN INSURANCE
LITIGATION: BREACH OF EXPRESS CONTRACT; BREACH OF AN IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING; INDEPENDENT TORT
OF BAD FAITH; AND THEORY OF EXCESS LIABILITY
(EXCESS JUDGMENT)
As early as 1872, the United States Supreme Court accepted the view that
an insurance contract is an agreement to pay money. 15 State courts, how-
ever, disagree on the type and amount of award an insured must receive
when an insurer breaches that agreement. Much of this conflict stems from
state supreme courts' adoption of competing theories of recovery.
History reveals that many state supreme courts adopted the principles
outlined in the well-known 1854 English contract case, Hadley v. Bax-
endale,'6 to settle disputes between insureds and insurers. State courts
viewed insurance policies as another form of contract and, therefore, con-
strued such policies according to strict principles of contract interpreta-
tion.' 7 Consequently, when deciding whether to compensate an aggrieved
policyholder, courts examined the express terms of the contract. If a breach
had occurred, the insured was entitled to receive only limited damages, plus
interest.18 Further, the insured could not recover damages for mental dis-
tress, medical expenses or inconvenience; courts considered such compensa-
tion to be outside the contemplation of the parties when they consummated
the insurance contract.' 9
Gradually, some state supreme courts recognized that an unwavering ad-
herence to strict principles of contract law would be unjust. Thus, they ap-
plied another principle of contract law that an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing exists in every insurance contract. In 1882, the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky embraced this principle in Germania Insurance Co.
15. Cf Insurance Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378, 382 (1873).
16. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (ruling that consequential damages are limited to
those that naturally arise from the breach or that were reasonably foreseeable to the parties
when the contract was made.)
17. E. Neil Young et al., Insurance Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends, 625 INS.
L.J. 71, 72 (1975) (hereinafter Young].
18. See Bye v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 164, 166 (La. App. 1975)
(holding that recovery for a breach is limited to the amount due within the policy limits, plus
legal interest).
19. See e.g., Kerwin v. Massachusetts. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 53-54 (Mich.
1980) (ruling that a disability insurance policy is a commercial contract; therefore, damages
only are recoverable for breaches which were within the contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made); Clark v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 53 S.W.2d 968, 969-970 (Ky. 1932)
(holding that an aggrieved policyholder may not recover damages for mental distress).
[Vol. 41:325
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v. Rudwig & Co. 2' Thirty-two years later, in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty
Co. 2 1 the New York Court of Appeals stressed that an insured's rights "go
deeper than the mere surface of the contract,",22 because a contractual obli-
gation of good faith underlies all written agreements including insurance
policies. Moreover, the Brassil court held that insurers have an obligation of
good faith to carry out both the express and implied terms of an insurance
contract.2 3
Perhaps, more than any other factor, the inconsistent application of the
implied good faith principle explains why so many insurance-law litigants
believe that "judicial bias" permeates state supreme courts. Under the prin-
ciple of good faith and fair dealing, both disgruntled policyholders and third
parties24 may recover financial rewards for a number of violations, 25 includ-
ing a breach of the express terms of the insurance policy. Nonetheless, both
the amount and the types of damages recoverable under an implied covenant
of good faith seriously divide state supreme courts. Some supreme tribunals
allow both first-party and third-party plaintiffs to recover extensive conse-
quential and punitive damages. Others restrict the amount of recoverable
20. 80 Ky. 223, 235 (1882) (stressing that an insured's innocent misrepresentations in a
life insurance application do not grant the insurer the right to avoid the policy; such a result
would subvert the "rule of good faith and fair dealing that should enter into and form a part of
every insurance contract").
21. 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).
22. Id. at 624.
23. See id.; see also Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 250 A.2d 580, 587-88 (N.J. 1969)
("Insurance policies are contracts of the utmost good faith and must be administered and
performed as such by the insurer. Good faith 'demands that the insurer deal with laymen as
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting.' ") (citations omitted).
Other courts apply a more even-handed standard. See United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Morris, 741
P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1987). In Morris, the court stated:
Why shouldn't the insured be equally bound to respect the terms of the contract?...
[T]here is in every insurance contract a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, im-
plied in law, whereby each of the parties is bound to refrain from any action which
would impair the benefits ... [flowing] from the contract or [from] the contractual
relationship.
Id. at 255-56.
24. See generally, infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
25. Other violations include: attempting to settle a claim without giving notice to the
insured; compelling an insured to sue; delaying the investigation of a claim; delaying the pay-
ment of a claim; denying coverage outright; failing to acknowledge claims; failing to inform
insured about the status of benefits; failing to investigate a claim; failing to defend a suit; failing
to process a claim in a timely fashion; failing to settle claim in a timely manner; failing to settle
within policy limits; intentionally inflicting emotional distress; refusing to issue a policy; refus-
ing to pay a first-party claim; refusing to pay a third-party claim; and, terminating an employ-
ment contract. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 331 n.1. (Cal. 1979)
(listing unfair practices in the California Insurance Code), overruled on other grounds, Moradi-
Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988).
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damages to the value specified in the policy-limits clause of the insurance
contract.26
In addition, another conflict arises-one more serious than the amount-of-
recovery controversy:
Jurisdictions differ in their treatment of a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in [an] insurance context.
Some jurisdictions characterize the cause of action as merely a
breach of contract; others characterize the cause of action as a tort
in third-party cases but not [in] first-party cases[.] [S]till others
characterize the cause of action as a tort in both first-party and
21third-party cases.
Moreover, another rule further complicates this morass: under either a con-
tract or an independent-tort-of-bad-faith action the insured may obtain con-
sequential damages for economic loss and emotional distress and, when
appropriate, punitive damages.28
Finally, a careful analysis of first-party and third-party decisions reveals
even deeper divisions among state supreme courts that recognize the tort of
bad faith as an independent cause of action. For example, in suits involving
first-party insurance, courts have reached conflicting results over whether
damages should be awarded where insurers allegedly failed to process, inves-
tigate, defend, bargain, settle or pay a claim.29 Moreover, in third-party in-
surance actions, a major controversy exists over the proper test for assessing
whether an insurer is liable for a judgment in excess of the policy limits.
Some supreme courts apply the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing when
the complainant is a policyholder or an excess insurer. Other courts apply
26. Compare Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 562 P.2d 965, 969 (Or. 1977) (suggesting
that under a strict contract approach, a breach of the covenant of good faith restricts the
amount of recovery to the face value of the policy) with Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
795, 801 (Utah 1985) (stressing that "there is no reason to limit damages recoverable for
breach of a duty to investigate, bargain, and settle claims in good faith to the amount specified
in the insurance policy").
27. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (Alaska 1989);
see also, Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981) (observing that
under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "[t]he duty to ... act is imminent in the
contract whether the company is attending to the claims of third persons against the insured or
the claims of the insured itself"). For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the independ-
ent tort of bad faith, a representative list of relevant state supreme court cases and an outline of
the arguments for and against this action, see Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611
P.2d 149, 151-53 (Kan. 1980).
28. See Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980) (recognizing that an
insurer's duty "to deal fairly and in good faith with an insured is implied by law").
29. See generally, infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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the doctrine of subrogation3" when the aggrieved party is an excess in-
surer.3 Arguably, the inconsistent application of bad-faith rules among
first-party and third-party litigants contributes to the impression that state
supreme courts unwittingly discriminate against consumers or in favor of the
insurance industry.
II. THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
INVOLVING FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE
A. Conflict Over the Origin of the Insurer's Duty to Deal Fairly
and in Good Faith
The previous section showed that while some state supreme courts allow
insureds to sue insurance companies in tort for bad faith, others do not. But
among those tribunals which recognize an independent tort action for bad
faith, significant confusion exists over whether an insurer's duty to act
responsibly is implied in fact 32 or implied in law. 3 Stated differently, state
supreme courts are seriously divided over whether the duty to satisfy the
reasonable expectations of the insured evolves from the insurance contract,
from the contractual relationship between the parties, or from some other
body of law.
Much of this confusion stems from state supreme courts' use of imprecise
language when deciding bad-faith causes of actions. Cases holding that an
insurer's duty to act stems from the terms of the insurance contract support
this observation. For example, Kentucky's highest court concluded that the
"rule of good faith and fair dealing . ..form[s] a part of every insurance
contract."34 Conversely, the Arizona Supreme Court held that "the duty to
... act is imminent in the contract."3 5 To further complicate matters, the
Supreme Court of Colorado decided that "[t]he basis for liability in tort...
30. For a definition of subrogation, see Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 137
(1962) (stating that under the doctine of subrogation "a surety who pays the debt of another is
entitled to all the rights of the person he paid to enforce his right to be reimbursed").
31. See generally, infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
32. Cf Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 801 P.2d 639 (N.M. 1990). The court
stressed that: "Whether express or not, every contract imposes upon the parties a duty of good
faith and fair dealings in its performance and enforcement." Id. at 642. However, the court
noted that the "[a]pplication of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing becomes difficult
... where ... it may be argued that from the covenant there is to be implied in fact a term or
condition necessary to effect the purpose of a contract." Id.
33. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 203 (Cal. 1958) (noting that
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every insurance contract, but the
covenant is implied in law rather than implied in fact).
34. Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig & Co., 80 Ky. 223, 235 (1882) (emphasis added).
35. Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981) (emphasis
added).
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is grounded upon the special nature of the insurance contract."'36 Nonethe-
less, that court, along with several other supreme tribunals, maintained that
the duty to act arises from a contractual relationship 37 rather than from the
contract.
Furthermore, an Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision illustrates another
unnecessarily complicated bad-faith holding. Accepting the general notion
that an insurer has a duty to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, unlike other supreme courts, maintained:
"There must be either a contractual or [a] statutory relationship between the
insurer and the party asserting the bad faith claim before the duty arises.
'
"38
While the Supreme Court of Kansas has refused to recognize an independ-
ent tort of bad faith,39 it has held that "only contractual damages are avail-
able for a breach of an insurance contract."'  That ruling, however, is
bothersome, because it only exacerbates the confusion surrounding bad-faith
litigation. Thus, in Kansas, an insurance company's duty to deal fairly and
in good faith evolves from a state-imposed statutory relationship4 rather
than from a contractual relationship.
Finally, some courts have ruled that an insurer is a trustee; therefore, a
quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an insurance company and a poli-
cyholder.4 2 Specifically, Colorado, Florida, New Jersey and Wisconsin
36. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1140-1141 (Colo. 1984) (emphasis
added).
37. Id. at 1141. See also Thomas v. Principal Fin. Group, 566 So. 2d 735, 736 (Ala. 1990)
(reiterating that bad faith is a failure of the insurer to perform his duty that stems from the
contractual relationship); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo.
1990) ("The insurance contract is one of these special classes of contracts so that this duty of
good faith and fair dealing imposed by law arises from the contractual relationship"); United
Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 780 P.2d 193, 197 (Nev. 1989) ("Liability for bad faith is strictly
tied to the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of an underlying
contractual relationship"); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 793-794 (Iowa 1988) ("it is
appropriate to recognize the first-party bad faith tort to provide the insured an adequate rem-
edy for an insurer's wrongful conduct. We think this recognition is... justified by the nature
of the contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured").
38. Roach v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 769 P.2d 158, 161 (Okla. 1989).
39. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 158 (Kan. 1980).
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 158. ("The legislature has provided several remedies for an aggrieved insured
and has dealt with the question of good faith first party claims.")
42. WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 1.05 (1989)
[hereinafter SHERNOFF]. Shernoff states that:
[U]nder conventional theory, there was no fiduciary relationship between an insurer
and its insured .... However, this traditional contract approach seems to have been
supplanted in large measure by the ... judicial concept of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, violation of which may give rise to a tort cause of ac-
tion .... The modem approach seems to recognize that the relationship between the
insurer and insured has a fiduciary character.
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Supreme Courts have ruled that "an insurance company stands in a position
similar to that of a fiduciary[,]" particularly when handling third-party
claims brought against the insured.43 In Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble,'
the Supreme Court of Colorado held that insurance contract forms the basis
of the quasi-fiduciary relationship.45
B. Conflict Over the Standard for Determining a Bad-Faith
Breach of Duty
In addition to the implied-in-law and implied-in-fact controversy, the
standard for establishing an independent tort of bad faith is unclear. Is it an
intent standard or a negligence standard? This issue confuses state supreme
courts. Consequently, the results of these courts differ. Some courts that
subscribe to the intent standard adopt an "objective" test. To maintain a
bad faith claim under that test, the insured must demonstrate that the in-
surer did not have a reasonable basis for denying coverage. The insured
must also show "defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard ... for denying
the claim."46 This "objective standard" has been frequently labled the
"fairly-debatable" intent test and several states within the First, Seventh,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits47 have adopted it.
Id.
43. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Colo. 1984). See also Baxter v.
Royal Indem. Co., 317 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1973) (recognizing as valid the rule that a fiduci-
ary obligation exists between an insured and an insurer under an automobile insurance policy;
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 323 A.2d 495, 507 (N.J. 1974) (holding than an
insurer, "having contractually restricted the independent negotiating power of its insured, has
a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the
policy coverage"); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, - (Wis. 1978) (defining
bad faith as an intentional tort arising from "a breach of [a fiduciary] duty imposed as a
consequence of the relationship established by contract").
Other supreme courts refuse to adopt these positions. The Supreme Court of Utah, for
example, has held "that in a first-party relationship between an insurer and its insured, the
duties and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a
breach of those implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause of action in contract, not
one in tort." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
44. 691 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Colo. 1984).
45. Id. at 1141.
46. Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867-868 (Ariz. 1981) (citing An-
derson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (Wis. 1978)). The Noble court held
that "[u]nder the Anderson standard an insurance company may still challenge claims which
are fairly debatable. The tort of bad faith arises when the insurance company intentionally
denies, fails to process or pay a claim without a reasonable basis for such action." 624 P.2d at
868.
47. For example, according to the court in McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d
855, 859-860 (Wyo. 1990), bad faith was an intentional tort and "the appropriate test to deter-
mine bad faith is the objective standard whether the validity of the denied claim was not fairly
debatable." Id. at 860 (emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme court ruled that "[w]here a claim
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Other supreme courts within the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also embrace
an "objective" intent standard. In those jurisdictions, however, the measure
is called the "arguably-debatable" standard. Under this latter version, an
aggrieved policyholder must go beyond a mere showing of nonpayment of a
claim.48 He also must prove that the insurance company intentionally re-
fused to pay the claim. 49 Finally, the policyholder must show that the insur-
ance company lacked a "reasonably-legitimate" or "arguably-debatable"
reason for the refusal.
50
These competing intent standards are complex and provide little guidance
for insurers, first-party complainants or triers of fact. A well-reasoned dis-
senting opinion in Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield 5 illustrates the current
confusion. There, Justices Embry asked:
What is the test for the tort of bad faith? . . .In California 'the
ultimate test of liability in ... first-party cases is whether the re-
fusal to pay policy benefits is unreasonable. . . .' [T]he Wisconsin
Supreme Court held the tort of bad faith to be an intentional one,
but based its test ... on the lack of a reasonable basis for denial of
a claim .... Similarly, in Ohio an insured may recover upon proof
is 'fairly debatable,' the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of
fact or law." Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988). The Dolan court
stated that the test is an objective one and clearly establishes the intentional natural of the tort
of bad faith. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d
313, 319 (R.I. 1980), stated that recognition of the tort of bad faith does not "imply that
whenever an insurance company loses a dispute in court regarding the validity of a claim, it
breaches the implied-in-law duty of good faith. If a claim is 'fairly debatable,' no liability in
tort will arise." Id. at 319. Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Anderson v. Continental
Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978), observed that "'Bad faith' by definition cannot be
unintentional. 'Bad Faith' is defined as '[d]eceit; duplicity; insincerity'." Id. at 376 (quoting
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 471 (1969)).
48. See, e.g., King v. National Found. Life Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 502, 504 (Ala. 1989)
(quoting extensively National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179 (Ala. 1982)).
The Bowen court held:
[T]he plaintiff in a 'bad faith refusal' case has the burden of proving: (a) an insurance
contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant; (b) an intentional
refusal to pay the insured's claim; (c) the absence of any reasonably legitimate or
arguable reason for that refusal (the absence of a debatable reason); (d) the insurer's
actual knowledge of the absence of any legitimate or arguable reason; [and] (e) ...
the insurer's intentional failure to determine whether there is a legitimate or arguable
reason to refuse to pay the claim.
541 So. 2d at 504. See also Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d 833 (Miss.
1984). In Campbell, the court held that punitive damages are not available when an insurance
company has an arguable or legitimate reason for denying coverage. Id. at 851. An arguable
reason for denying payment of a claim exists if there is some credible evidence that would
support a jury's conclusion that bad faith was not present.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 373 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1979)
[Vol. 41:325
Judicial Bias
that the insurer had no intention of paying the claim, but such
intention may be demonstrated by the lack of reasonable basis for
denial.... [But according to the tests of these other courts,] [wjhat
a reasonable insurer would do or not do is a negligence test.52
Although Justice Embry would reject the use of the negligence standard,
his last comment illuminates that negligence standard.53 But as the Supreme
Court of Montana observed, a clear distinction between a cause of action for
negligence and for bad faith does not exist. In fact, the Montana court
pointed out that while differences between bad faith and negligence tests ex-
ist, in practice courts have merged the two tests.5 4 More important, a care-
ful comparison of the intent and negligence standards, within the context of
a bad-faith action, shows little difference between the two measures. Under
either test, a complainant must prove that an insurer's action or inaction was
unreasonable. "
Arguably, no significant difference exists between a negligence and an in-
tent standard in the context of first-party suits. Citing the limited amount of
evidence presented thus far, bad-faith litigants could reasonably conclude
that state supreme courts are biased. In first-party situations, justices must
articulate more precise and intelligible decisions in this area of law. By out-
lining definitive standards, state supreme courts would help counter the
52. Id. at 1067 (Embry, J., dissenting) (emphasis added and removed).
53. Id.; see also, Reynolds v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 766 P.2d 1243 (Idaho
1988). Where a complainant asserts a negligence claim he must show, "(1) a duty, recognized
by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and
(4) actual loss or damage." Id. at 1246-47 (citing Alegria v. Payonk, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (Idaho
1980). "An examination of the tests for bad faith devised in other jurisdictions reveals that
most open the door for recoveries based on negligence." Vincent, 373 So. 2d at 1067.
54. Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725, 731 (Mont. 1984).
55. For example, in South Carolina, a negligence rather than an intent standard has been
embraced to establish the tort of bad faith. An insured may recover damages for an insurer's
negligent handling of a first-party claim. But, under South Carolina law, liability will ensue
only when the insurer's conduct is "unreasonable." In Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 306 S.E.2d 616 (S.C. 1983), the court stated:
[W]e held in Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.
346 (1933), that an insurer's unreasonable refusal to settle within policy limits sub-
jects the insurer to tort liability. We have held also that unreasonable refusal on the
insurer's part to accept an offer of compromise settlement will render it liable in tort
to the insured for the amount of the judgment against the insured in excess of policy
limits. The cause of action we consider today and that which is commonly known as
the 'Tyger River Doctrine,' are merely two different aspects of the same duty.
Id. at 618-19 (citation omitted). Similarly, in New Hampshire, the test for the tort of bad faith
is a negligence standard. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled that a jury may
review evidence to determine the "reasonableness" of the insurer's conduct, in situations where
the insurer allegedly refused to pay or delayed the payment of a claim. Drop Anchor Realty
Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 496 A.2d 339, 343 (N.H. 1985).
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widespread impression that state courts are politically motivated.56 A de-
lineation of objective standards would also counter the perception that state
supreme courts are more concerned about obtaining a particular result than
about consistently applying legal principles.5 7
III. THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
INVOLVING THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE
As noted, state supreme courts unwittingly create the impression that they
are biased in favor of either the insurance industry or the consuming public.
Professor Callahan, who has investigated and written about third-party in-
surance decisions, makes an even stronger indictment against state courts.
58
He asserts that judicial bias permeates third-party insurance decisions be-
cause state supreme courts do not apply legal rules.59 Instead, according to
Professor Callahan, the courts' use of ambiguous language, as well as the
parties' use of legal jargon, influence the outcome of cases." A careful re-
view of third-party suits supports Professor Callahan's assertions, especially
in light of actions brought by insureds, assignees, third-party beneficiaries,
and excess insurers' actions to recover excess-judgment damages.
56. See generally, Walter Olson, Why Business Loses in Court, FORTUNE May 23, 1988, at
127-30 (reviewing RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN
BE RESCUED FROM STATE COURT POLITICS (1987)). Olson writes: "Richard Neely... is a
modern judge .... [He] is no cardboard demagogue .... [But Neely shares] the widespread view
that judges are no more than politicians in robes." Id. Olson concludes by suggesting that
judges are more concerned about their constituents' interests than about justice. Id. at 130.
57. See Young, supra note 17, at 72-73 (stating "prevailing judicial rationales are often so
camouflaged by reference to 'established rules' that it is impossible to pair a given situation
with the appropriate doctrines so as to achieve a high degree of predictability").
58. Peter M. Callahan, Some Thoughts on the Avoidance of Extra-Contractual Damages in
California Insurance Litigation, 14 W. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 73, 75-78 (1986).
59. Id. at 77-78.
60. Id.; Professor Callahan writes:
[T]here is much truth in the perception of many claims people that there are in fact,
no 'rules' or concrete definition of bad faith and therefore what may result in ex-
tracontractual ... damages in one courtroom could result in a defense verdict in a
contemporaneous trial right next door, since the latter finders of fact may have a
different interpretation of what actions should be deemed 'unfair.' . . . Many appel-
late opinions do not address themselves to any analysis of a factual context at all, but




A. Interurisdictional Conflicts Over Whether Insureds May Recover
Damages in Excess of Policy Limits
An individual purchases liability insurance, among other reasons, to pro-
tect himself against the legitimate claims of injured third parties.6 1 How-
ever, when a primary carrier refuses to defend 62 the insured or to settle63 a
third-party's claim against the insured within the policy limits," the insured
may incur excess liability,65 which is not covered by the policy.
61. SHERNOFF, supra note 42, § 3.01 at 3-3. The author observes:
Nearly all insurance policies can be classified into one of two types: those that pro-
vide 'first[-]party' coverage and those that provide 'third-party coverage.'.. . (U]nder
a policy providing third-party or liability coverage[,] the insured, faced with a claim
by a third-party or outside claimant, seeks indemnity from his or her insurer for the
claim.
Id.
62. See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1136, 1137 (1954). Generally, liability insurance policies provide that the primary
carrier shall "'defend any suit against the insured ... even if such suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient.'" Id. (footnote omitted). See also PAT MAGARICK, Ex-
cEss LIABILITY: THE LAW OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF INSURERS (1990) [here-
inafter MAGARICK]. Magarick asks:
How then to determine whether an insurer owes a defense to the insured if a suit is
instituted against him? Generally speaking, the vast majority of decisions hold that
an insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations in the complaint. If the
allegations are covered by the terms of the policy, the duty to defend arises. If the
allegations are not covered, the insurer owes no duty to defend the policyholder.
Id. § 2.01, at 2-1 (footnote omitted).
63. See MAGARICK and accompanying cases, supra note 62, § 8.03, at 8-9.
The duty to settle has been held to arise out of the entire contractual relationship of
the parties since the insurance company has the right under the policy to exclusive
control of the settlement of claims and suits under the provisions of the ordinary
liability policy. Wrongful refusal to settle within the policy limits also has been held
to be a breach of contract by some courts, while others have held that an action based
on such refusal is founded in tort. Still others have held that the good faith duty to
settle 'sounds both in contract and [in] tort.'
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. See WIDISS supra note 1, § 5.9 at 541.
Pecuniary limits of liability are specified in most types of insurance [contracts] in
order to restrict the magnitude of the risks that are transferred to the insurer. Typi-
cally, for example, one provision in a property insurance policy specifies an amount
of coverage that sets the insurer's maximum liability when an insured event oc-
curs.... And liability insurance is usually written with either (a) per-person and per-
occurrence ... limits of liability ... or (b) a single limit of liability that applies both
to any individual claim and to any group of claims resulting from a single
occurrence.
Id. (footnote omitted).
65. The terms "excess liability" and "excess judgment" are used interchangeably in this
writing. See SHERNOFF, supra note 42, at § 3.01 (stating that a typical liability policy gives the
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Where the insurer refuses to accept a settlement within the insurance con-
tract's limits, many cases :.old a primary carrier liable for an excess judg-
ment against the insured.66 Both commentators and courts agree that if an
indemnification agreement embraces only some of a third party's allegations,
the insurance company must defend the entire suit. 67 Despite the agreement
by courts on these issues, courts are divided on at least two other important
issues.
First, state supreme courts generate biased and incompatible principles
when they attempt to outline the origin of the insurer's duty to satisfy excess
judgments against the insured. For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
ruled that the insurance company's duty stems from its contract with the
insured. 6' By contrast, both the Arkansas and Colorado supreme courts em-
ploy a negligence test to assess whether an insurer's conduct deviates from
an acceptable standard of care.6 9 In Colorado, the supreme court found that
the negligence standard derives from the quasi-fiduciary nature of the par-
ties' relationship.7
0
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, has held that a fiduciary
rather than a quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an insurance com-
pany and a policyholder, especially when the company handles third-party
claims.7' A carrier, therefore, breaches its fiduciary duty when it fails to
defend or refuses to settle a claim within policy limits. 72 To further compli-
cate this area of law, several other states73 have adopted a bad-faith standard
insured the right to defend and settle a claim; but it also "imposes a duty to defend third-party
actions against the insured"). In addition Shernoff asserts:
insurers [are] obligated to act in good faith [when] determining whether ... to settle
actions against their insureds. When the insurer breaches this obligation, the insured
may bring an action against the insurer for the amount of any judgment entered
against the insured in excess of the policy limits. This action by the insured is com-
monly referred to as an 'excess[-]judgment suit.'
Id. (footnotes omitted).
66. Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Safeway Stores, 610 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Cal. 1980); see
also, Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584, 586 (Cal. 1976) (holding that the insurer's
duty of good faith requires it to "settle within policy limits when there is substantial likelihood
of recovery in excess of those limits").
67. SHERNOFF, supra note 42, at § 3.21[4].
68. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1980) (quot-
ing Peter v. Travellers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
69. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1984); Employers Equitable
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 665 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Ark. 1984) ("The third party tort of bad faith
is the negligent failure of an insurer to settle a third party claim within the policy limits.").
70. Farmers Group, 691 P.2d at 1142.
71. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 323 A.2d 495, 507 (N.J. 1974).
72. Id.
73. See generally, MAGARICK, supra note 62, at §§ 10.04-10.06 (discussing bad-faith stan-
dards adopted by jurisdictions in both first-and third-party claims).
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to determine whether an insurer breached its duty when handling a third-
party claim.74
The second controversial issue confronting insureds who commence ex-
cess-judgment suits against primary carriers centers on when a primary car-
rier should compensate a policyholder for damages associated with an
excess-judgment verdict. Should the insurer reimburse the policyholder only
after the insured has made a payment to an injured third party? Or should
the carrier compensate the insured soon after an excess-judgment verdict has
been entered against the insured?
The reasonable expectation of the policyholder would effectuate a com-
monsensical and universal rule that the insurer must pay the insured imme-
diately after a court enters a judgment in excess of the policy limits.
Predictably, however, courts have applied more than one school of thought.
Some state supreme courts have adopted the "judgment rule," which states
that an entry of an excess-liability verdict alone is sufficient for an insured to
recover damages from an insurer.75 Under the judgment rule, the insured
need not "allege that he has paid or will pay a judgment in excess of the
policy limits in an action against the insurer." 76
On the other hand, other state supreme courts have rejected the judgment
rule and embraced the "payment rule" to resolve excess-liability actions. In
a recent decision, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the
judgment rule after reconsidering dissenting Justice Levin's prior arguments
for adopting the payment rule.77 Instead, the court held that when a carrier
fails to settle a third-party claim and the policyholder incurs a judgment in
excess of policy limits, the insurer's liability for the excess is limited to the
amount the third-party might collect from the insured.78 Under the pay-
ment rule, the insured must "first make [a] payment or... have the capacity
to pay the judgment in order to recover damages from the insurer."'7 9
74. The Supreme Court of Arizona has ruled that a primary carrier may avoid bad-faith
liability if the carrier (1) retains competent counsel to defend the insured; (2) informs the
insured of all material developments and settlement offers; (3) thoroughly investigates a claim;
and (4) gives equal consideration to the interests of the insured when negotiating the claim.
See Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 792 P.2d 719, 722 (Ariz. 1990) (outlining
additional factors to be considered by the trier of fact in a third-party bad faith claim).
75. See, e.g., Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Casualty Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 190-91 (Ohio 1981)
(adopting the "judgement rule" and citing cases from other states).
76. Id. at 190 n.2. (quoting Jenkins v. General Accident Fire Life Assur. Corp., 212
N.E.2d 464, 467 (Mass. 1965)).
77. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1990).
78. Id. at 667.
79. Id. at 668 (Archer, J., dissenting). Justice Archer reminded the Frankenmuth court
that it had "held that when an insurer's bad-faith refusal to settle results in a judgment in
excess of its policy limits, the measure of damages is the amount of the excess judgment." Id.
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The most disturbing feature concerning the conflict between the judgment
and payment rules stems from the refusal of state supreme courts to articu-
late persuasive and intelligible reasons for adopting these and other rules of
recovery. Instead, state tribunals simply conclude that the judgment rule is
more or less superior to the payment rule. In other words, such behavior
lends credence to what a number of scholars and commentators believe:
state supreme courts have hidden political agendas, and the justices are bi-
ased either in favor of the insurance industry or in favor of the consumers.80
B. Interjurisdictional Conflicts Over Whether Assignees May Recover
Damages in Excess of Policy Limits
State courts are also divided as to whether assignees may recover damages
in excess of policy limits. When a carrier refuses to settle or defend against a
third-party claim, the insured is often exposed to liability in excess of the
policy limits. To remedy this unjust situation, some states permit the in-
sured to commence a bad-faith tort action against the carrier to recover ex-
cess damages.8 l But often the disgruntled policyholder and the injured third
party enter an agreement to settle their excess-liability conflict. Under the
agreement, the insured agrees not to sue his primary carrier. Instead, the
aggrieved policyholder assigns his bad-faith tort action to the injured party.
The third-party victim agrees to sue the insurer directly for the excess judg-
ment and to release the insured from liability.
Presently, state supreme courts disagree over whether to allow the assign-
ment of a bad-faith tort claim in these circumstances. It is disturbing that
cases involving such a controversy are still appearing in state supreme
courts, consuming these tribunals' limited resources and time. As most first-
year law students discover, the common-law is fairly settled on one point:
personal-injury tort claims are not assignable.8 2 Nonetheless, most courts,
presently refuse to adhere to this strict principle of law. 3 The majority of
Justice Archer also informed the court that they had rejected the insurance company's argu-
ment "that an insured is injured and incurs pecuniary losses recoverable as contract damages
only by paying or having the ability to pay the judgment." Id. He closed by reminding the
majority that "[w]e reasoned that, in the bad-faith failure-to-settle context, the insured's injury
and right to compensation should not turn upon his financial status, but rather upon the conse-
quences flowing from the excess judgment itself." Id.
80. See supra notes 9-31 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 74-75.
82. Cf Mello v. General Ins. Co., 525 A.2d 1304, 1305 (R.I. 1987) (citing Etheridge v.
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 480 A.2d 1341, 1345 (R.I. 1984)).
83. The Supreme Court of Kansas, however, follows this principle. "[A] right of action
for damages resulting from a tort is not assignable;" the party commencing the suit must "own
the cause of action" and be "a real party in interest." Heinson v. Porter, 772 P.2d 778, 783-85
(Kan. 1989), overuled in part on other grounds, Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1990)
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state supreme courts are not indifferent to the evils of champerty and main-
tenance, but it appears that they are more concerned about satisfying the
reasonable expectations of an aggrieved policyholder. Moreover, if sanction-
ing the assignment of a tort claim for excess damages satisfies those expecta-
tions, courts will allow the assignment.84
It should be fairly evident that these supreme court rulings are not benefi-
cial. They fail to provide a sound methodology that would help litigants
decide whether their claims qualify as one of those "limited circumstances"
where assignment is allowed. More pertinently, by departing from settled
law,8" without providing intelligible or compelling reasons for the deviation,
state supreme courts lend support to the view that state courts are biased
against the insurance industry. As one commentator observed:
(quoting Star Mfg. Co. v. Mancuso, 680 F. Supp. 1496, 1498-99 (D. Kan 1988)). Apparently,
third parties who attempt to collect excess-judgment damages do not fall into either category.
More important, it appears that the Supreme Court of Kansas is concerned about the twin
evils of champerty and maintenance because it has clearly stated that "[tlort claims are per-
sonal in nature and third parties should not be permitted to buy claims for personal injuries
and losses." Id. at 785. In fact, the court characterizes such third-party actions as "the traffic
of merchandising in quarrels [and] of huckstering litigious discord." Id. at 784.
It appears that the Supreme Court of Tennessee also has a similar concern because it has
ruled that a tort action is not assignable in Tennessee. Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 381
S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tenn. 1964). Quoting from a Harvard Law Review article, the court
observed:
A doctrine or statute permitting [a third-party] claimant to recover the excess from
[a] company, either in his own right or as assignee of insured, is only slightly benefi-
cial to insured-the one who is the victim of [the] company's wrong. [The] [i]nsured
is protected by the cause of action for reimbursement.... The person greatly bene-
fited by such doctrine is [the third-party] claimant-a person not harmed by [a] com-
pany's refusal to settle. A judicial extension (either by tort or by implied contract
theory) of the liability of [a] company beyond that undertaken by the agreement
cannot be justified by a purpose of benefiting a third party who is not harmed by
anything [the] company has done or failed to do.).
Id. (quoting Keeton, supra note 62, at 1176-77).
84. Some support for this line of reasoning appears in a recent decision from the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island. In Mello the court states vigorously:
'We do not reject the general prohibition against the purchasing of personal-injury
claims by intermeddling volunteers for their own profit. [But] [w]e simply cannot
allow a salutary rule to be applied in a context in which it has no meaning and
thereby obstruct an appropriate device for the payment of a claim by an insurance
carrier that has an obligation to its insured to absolve him of liability. . . .' While we
do not advocate a general policy of allowing assignment of the right to sue an insur-
ance company for bad faith, we are convinced that in certain limited circumstances
the insured's right may be assigned.
525 A.2d at 1306 (quoting Etheridge, 480 A.2d at 1345).
85. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958) (hold-
ing action for damages is assignable whether sounding in tort on contract); Pietrantonio v.
Travellers Ins. Co., 275 N.W. 786, 788 (Mich. 1937) (stating that the executor could assign a
policy to an injured passenger in automobile accident).
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It is pretty obvious that.., assignments, conditioned on a release
of further liability for the insured, have all of the appearances of
collusion between the insured and the plaintiff to team up against
the insurer. It is, in fact, hard to imagine a situation where such an
agreement could be made without some very fine-line discussions
between the parties. Nevertheless, the courts have consistently
looked at this situation with glazed eyes. 8
6
C. Interjurisdictional Conflicts Over Whether Third-Party Beneficiaries
and Judgment Creditors May Recover Damages in Excess of
Policy Limits
Both third-party beneficiaries and judgment creditors87 must confront in-
consistently applied theories of recovery in excess-damages suits. This is
true even though third-party beneficiaries and creditors have been the sub-
ject of considerably less litigation in state supreme courts than insureds.88
Liability insurance is purchased primarily to recompense injured third
parties.89 Therefore, one would expect such parties to have little difficulty
obtaining the right to commence direct-action suits against liability carriers
for extracontractual damages. Yet, a critique of relevant state supreme court
decisions reveals much disagreement over the legal right of third parties to
sue an insurer for excess damages.
Rather than allowing a third-party claimant to go uncompensated or to
"drive the insured into bankruptcy, courts have permitted the third-party
claimant to recover directly against the insured upon a third-party benefici-
86. MAGARICK, supra note 62, at § 9.02.
87. Arguably, within the context of insurance suits for excess damages, a judgment credi-
tor is a third-party beneficiary. Blacks Law Dictionary defines a "judgment creditor" as "one
who has obtained a judgment against his debtor, under which he can enforce execution."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 844 (6th ed. 1990) Of course, this definition does not apply to a
third party who has been injured by an insured. But, the same dictionary defines a "third
party beneficiary" as "a person not a party to an insurance contract who has legally enforcea-
ble rights thereunder." Id. at 1480. Certainly, this latter definition includes a judgment credi-
tor. Several cases support this position. See First Nat'l Bank v. Higgins, 357 S.W.2d 139 (Mo.
1962); Homan v. Employers Reins. Corp., 136 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1939). Both Homan and First
Nat'l Bank construed treaties of reinsurance as contracts of indemnity against liability. These
courts deemed judgment creditors as third party beneficiaries. Nevertheless, this Article con-
siders these groups separately.
88. Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 262 (Wis. 1981).
89. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mc-
Carson, 467 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1985) (holding that the "insurer contracts to bear the in-
sured's financial responsibility to the intended third-party beneficiary"). But see PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 544 (1971) ("Since, in its inception, liability insurance
was intended solely for the benefit and protection of the insured, which is to say the tortfeasor,
it followed that the injured plaintiff, who was not a party to the contract, had at common law no
direct remedy against the insurance company") (emphasis added).
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ary theory." 9° The absence of privity of contract has not been a bar to such
actions. For example, in Thompson v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,91
the Florida Supreme Court held that a third party may sue the insurance
carrier directly for failure to settle. According to the court, the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing also protects an injured third party from a
carrier's intransigence. Therefore, a few courts view a suit to recover ex-
tracontractual damages as a proper remedy for an unwarranted breach of
the duty.
9 2
Conversely, other supreme courts9 3 adopt the view that no privity of con-
tract exists between an offending insurance company and an injured third
party. Therefore, a third party may not commence a direct action against a
liability carrier for damages in excess of the policy limits. In Idaho, this
direct-action rule has been applied consistently in a string of insurance
cases94 prefaced on a third-party beneficiary theory.
For example, in Downing v. Travelers Insurance Co. , the Idaho Supreme
Court held that a deceased train engineer's wife could not maintain a direct
action against the liability insurer on the theory that she was a third-party
beneficiary under a group liability policy for union members. The court
found that various collective-bargaining agreements had forced the employer
to purchase liability insurance specifically for union members. Because the
petitioner could not establish a right to any death benefits under the agree-
ments, the court barred her from suing the carrier directly as a third-party
beneficiary.9 6
90. Kranzush, 307 N.W.2d at 262.
91. 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971).
92. Id. at 261-64.
93. See, e.g., Severson v. Estate of Severson, 627 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1981); Pocatello Indus.
Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980); Miller v. Market Men's Mut. Ins. Co.,
115 N.W.2d 266 (Minn. 1962); see also, Manukas v. American Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 898 (N.J.
1968).
94. See Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co., 797 P.2d 81, 82 (Idaho 1990); Downing v. Travellers
Insurance Company, 691 P.2d 375, 378 (Idaho 1984); Pocatello, 621 P.2d at 407.
95. 691 P.2d at 378.
96. Id. at 378-79. The Idaho Supreme Court tells us:
This is a direct action against an insurer, by a party not a party to the insurance
contract. The situation here is similar to a case where A injures B, B has a liability
insurance policy with C, and A attempts to sue C directly to recover benefits under
the policy. This type of direct action has never been recognized. Here, by attempt-
ing to maintain the action against the insurance company, without first establishing
entitlement to any death benefits under the collective bargaining agreement, appel-
lant is attempting to circumvent the requirement that she establish a right under the
death benefit provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Appellant's claim is
based upon the death benefit provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Ap-
pellant should not be allowed to sue the insurance company directly any more than a
tort victim injured in an automobile accident should be able to directly sue the insur-
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Not surprisingly, state supreme courts also apply rules inconsistently in
third-party cases where judgment creditors attempt to bring direct actions
against insurers. But the overwhelming weight of authority holds that an
aggrieving, excess-judgment creditor cannot commence such direct ac-
tions.9 7 There are several competing explanations9" of why some state
supreme courts reject third-party claims against liability carries for sums in
excess of the policy limits.99 The majority of courts deny recovery because
(1) the insured alone bears the obligation of settling, (2) the third-party judg-
ment creditor has suffered no injury in fact, and (3) the judgment creditor is
not a party to the contract between the policy holder and the insurance com-
pany.I°° A common theme is present here: absent privity of contract or an
assignment, an injured judgment creditor may not initiate a direct action
against a carrier to collect excess-judgment damages.' °'
Of course, courts in Montana and in Kansas refuse to embrace this point
of view. In fact, the Supreme Court of Montana has adopted an extremely
divergent position: "After judgment against the insured, the [judgment
creditor] ... is in the same position as an insured with respect to the insur-
ance company. The contractual duties that exist. . . are protected by the
same concepts of good faith and fair dealing that pertain to contracts between
insurers and insureds."'' 0 2
The holding of the Kansas Supreme Court in Gilley v. Farmer 103 is both
exceptional and unsettling because the court's analysis is undeniably and un-
necessarily complex. In Gilley, an injured judgment creditor brought a di-
rect, bad-faith action against the insured's liability carrier to recover
ance carrier of the tortfeasor without having first proved a claim against the
tortfeasor individually.
Id. (citations omitted).
97. See Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 262-63 (Wis.
1981).
98. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 90-92; see also Rutter v. King, 226 N.W.2d
79 (Mich. 1974) (recognizing claim of third-party judgment creditor in a garnishment proceed-
ing); Gilley v. Farmer, 485 P.2d 1284 (Kan. 1971) (granting relief to a judgment creditor in a
garnishment action); Shaw v. Botens, 403 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1968) (involving a garnishment
action by a judgment creditor).
99. Kranzush, 307 N.W.2d at 263.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Bean v. Allstate Ins. Co., 403 A.2d 793, 794-96 (Md. 1979) (holding that the
insurer owed no duty to the third-party judgment creditor because there was no privity of
contract between the claimant and the liability insurance carrier).
102. Montana ex rel. Fitzgerald v. District Court, 703 P.2d 148, 158 (Mont. 1985) (empha-
sis added). The court also stated that "the contractual right of a third party claimant to sue
the insurer directly after judgment must include the right to receive payment of the determined
third party claim after judgment." Id.
103. 485 P.2d 1284 (Kan. 1971).
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damages in excess of the policy limits. The court considered whether a gar-
nishment proceeding was an appropriate vehicle for remedying the claim of
an aggrieved third party for extracontractual damages."° The Kansas court
answered the question affirmatively, but its inordinately complicated analy-
sis suggests that the court was biased against the insurance company.
The Kansas Supreme Court observed that the state's garnishment statute
failed to specify the types of indebtedness claims open to garnishment; rather
the statute only outlined an exception for noncontractual claims.' More-
over, the court declared that the exception applies only to unliquidated tort
claims.'0 6 But the defending insurance company argued this very point.
The company maintained that whatever cause of action the aggrieved third
party may have had to recover extracontractual damages, the action was
grounded in tort. From the carrier's perspective, the claim fell within the
exception and, therefore, was not subject to garnishment. 107
The Kansas court admitted that other supreme courts supported the lia-
bility carrier's argument, but stressed that those authorities provided no pre-
cedent for its deliberations.'0 8 More significantly, the court asserted that an
implied warranty for service existed between the insurer and the insured'0 9
and that a breach of the implied warranty permits an insured to commence
an action in tort or in contract." 0 In addition, the court stressed that the
law of garnishment is settled in Kansas: "The creditor takes the place of the
debtor .... The former takes only that which the latter could enforce."'
104. Id. at 1288.
105. Id. at 1289. The Kansas garnishment statute states that [n]o judgment shall be ren-
dered in garnishment by reason of the garnishee... holding moneys on a claim not arising out




108. Id. (citing Pringle v. Robertson, 465 P.2d 223 (Or. 1969) (holding that a judgment
creditor may not attach an insured's tort claim against an insurer); Steen v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 401 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1965) (upholding the dismissal of a garnishment action
brought by judgment creditor), Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 381 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964)
(denying a judgment creditor the right to maintain an action against an insurer for an amount
in excess of policy limits); Murray v. Mossman, 355 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1960) (holding that a
garnishment procedure was not available to judgment creditors in an action brought against
insurance company); Stilwell v. Parsons, 145 A.2d 397 (Del. 1958) (denying a judgment credi-
tor the right to bring a garnishment proceeding against an insurance carrier); Paul v. Kirken-
dall, 311 P.2d 376 (Utah 1957) (interpreting a garnishment statute to exclude pure tort
claims).
109. Gilley, 485 P.2d at 1289.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1290.
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Because the policyholder had a right to sue the liability carrier in a garnish-
ment proceeding, 1 2 an injured judgment creditor has that same right." 3
Gilley is particularly troublesome because the court failed to follow prece-
dent. To circumvent its own holding that unliquidated tort actions are
barred from garnishment proceedings," 4 the Supreme Court of Kansas re-
vised the character of the third-party's complaint. The judgment creditor
had filed a direct, bad-faith tort action. Nonetheless, the court conveniently
ignored that important fact and redefined the case as a breach of an implied
contract action. To make matters worse, the court reiterated an exceedingly
bad legal principle: "[A judgment creditor's] petition need not state whether
his action is based upon implied contract or tort."' " Thus, until Kansas and
other supreme courts stop issuing such strained decisions, all litigants-poli-
cyholders, primary carriers, assignees, third-party beneficiaries and judg-
ment creditors-will continue to question these tribunals' competence to
decide bad-faith and excess-liability cases predictably and fairly.
D. Interjurisdictional Conflicts Over Whether Excess Insurers May
Recover Damages in Excess of Policy Limits
Excess insurance emerges in two forms. First, the primary policy may
provide for excess coverage through an "other insurance" clause." 6 Second,
added coverage may be secured by purchasing a second policy. This latter
form, commonly referred to as an "umbrella" or an "excess" policy,"' 7 pro-
112. Bollinger v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502, 504 Syl § 2 (Kan. 1969) ("In this jurisdiction a
liability insurer may be held liable in excess of its undertaking under the policy if it acts negli-
gently or in bad faith when considering offers to compromise the claim against the insured for
an amount within policy limits").
113. Gilley, 485 P.2d at 1290 ("In the present garnishment action [the creditor] is wearing
the shoes of [the insured.]")
114. The court's failure to address this important issue is unfortunate because there is little
guidance for subsequent cases in which the liquidation issue appears. Moreover, this case
presented the Court with a good opportunity to decide the liquidated issue because both par-
ties argued the issue in the briefs. Id. at 1289-90.
115. Id. at 1289 (emphasis added).
116. See EMERIC FISCHER & PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 96-97
(1986) [hereinafter FISCHER & SWISHER] ("The first type might be called excess insurance by
coincidence, which occurs when the insured purchases two or more policies in the same insura-
ble risk under the mistaken belief that he can receive double or triple recovery for the insured
loss, in violation of insurance law indemnity principles").
117. See, MAGARICK, supra note 62, at § 17.01. Magarick explains:
Excess or umbrella policies are those that assume coverage for an insured above the
limits of primary or other excess policies. An insured may have several excess poli-
cies, each with its own underlying requirements and with layer limits of liability. ...
Their common feature is that each insurer over the primary underlying one is not
obligated to pay a loss or claim until the limit of liability of the policy for the layer
immediately below it is paid, or has been agreed to be paid.
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vides for "true"' excess coverage after an insured has exhausted all benefits
outlined in the policy-limits provision of the excess policy. Thus, after a
primary carrier pays its full limits of liability to an injured third party, the
excess policy requires the excess insurer to contribute any additional sums
up to the limits of liability specified within the insurance contract.
A primary liability carrier frequently refuses to settle a financial dispute
within policy limits or to defend actions involving injured third parties. This
type of conduct subjects the insured to liability in excess of policy limits.11 9
Under such circumstances, the question arises whether the excess insurer
must attempt either to settle or defend the case to prevent the insured from
incurring additional, extracontractual liability.
Among state supreme court rulings, the law governing an excess insurer's
obligations is settled: An excess insurer's duty to assist in an insured's de-
fense arises when the insured exhausts the benefits of the primary policy. 2 °
Moreover, even after an excess insurer's duty to participate is triggered, the
primary insurance company remains liable for expenses relating to its
coverage. 1
Nevertheless, two issues arise where the excess insurer incurs expenses
from defending an underlying third-party suit or pays extracontractual dam-
ages generated by the primary carrier's decision not to settle within policy
Id.
118. FISCHER AND SWISHER, supra note 116, at 97 (defining an "umbrella polic[y] [as]
'true' excess insurance over the primary insurer's limit since it is the express intent of the
insured, the primary insurer, and the excess insurer to provide this coverage").
119. See supra notes 63-67.
120. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 207, 209 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983); Signal Co., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 889, 896 (Cal. 1980); Olympic Ins.
Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). But
see, Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 349 S.E.2d 201, 205 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 355 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 1987), and vacated, 360 S.E.2d 78
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987). The court reviewed Georgia law and stated:
Although most of the cases dealing with the respective duties of the primary and the
excess insurer concern either disputes between insurers of two different vehicles or
two different drivers .... the principle is the same: [I]f the facts bring the occurrence
wholly, partially, or even arguably within the policies' coverage, then each insurer
(whether primary or otherwise) has a duty to defend the action, regardless of
whether liability, in whatever amount, is ultimately established.
Id.; see also Dochod v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Mich. App. 1978) (impos-
ing on an insurer the "duty to defend if the complaint alleges facts constituting a cause of
action"); Lees v. Smith, 363 So. 2d 974 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Seaboard Indus. v. Monaco, 392
A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
121. See, e.g., Nabisco, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 210; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Under-
writers, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 56-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); see also Emscor, Inc. v. Alliance Ins.
Group, 804 S.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "excess liability insurers
have no duty to defend an insured in the event of the insolvency of the insured's primary
general liability carrier").
1992]
Catholic University Law Review
limits. First, it is unclear whether the excess insurer may commence a direct
action against the primary insurer to recover damages for bad faith. Second,
it is equally uncertain whether the excess carrier may maintain a direct ac-
tion against the primary carrier for the latter's failure to settle and/or de-
fend22 a liability suit.
State supreme court decisions disagree about the merits of allowing an
excess insurer to commence a direct-action suit against the primary carrier
under the conditions outlined above. Many of these decisions are not well-
reasoned. Instead they are quite strained, reinforcing this Article's thesis
that state court decisions create the impression that judges are either pro-
consumer or pro-insurer.
A few state courts, for example, have held that the relationship between
the two carriers creates an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing that
flows directly and independently from the primary carrier to the excess in-
surer; therefore, the excess carrier may commence a direct action against the
primary carrier. 2 ' This rule, however, is particularly troublesome, because
courts have failed to identify both the origin and the character of the rela-
tionship which would justify an independent, direct action. Typically, an
excess and a primary insurer do not enter a liability contract, 124 so the pre-
requisite legal affiliation could not possibly emanate from a contractual ar-
122. See Capital Ford, 349 S.E.2d at 205 (holding that under Georgia law, "an insurer's
duty to pay and his duty to defend are separate and independent obligations"); Palmer v.
Pacific Indem. Co., 254 N.W.2d 52, 54-55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the duty to
defend is broader than the duty to pay); Ladner & Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d
100, 102 (Ala. 1977) (stating "that the insurer's duty to defend is more extensive than its duty
to pay."); Sloan Constr. Co. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 236 S.E.2d 818, 820 (S.C. 1977) (finding
that "[t]he duty to defend is separate and distinct from the obligation to pay a judgment ren-
dered against the insured").
123. See Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296, 1302 n.5
(Or. 1985) ("Some courts have held that the excess carrier's right of recovery is supportable on
the theory that the relationship between the primary insurer and the excess insurer gives rise
to an independent duty."); see also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 356
N.W.2d 648, 651 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 393 N.W.2d 479
(Mich. 1986) ("a direct action is justified where ... the excess insurer is the real party in
interest."). Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 463 N.E.2d 608, 610
(N.Y. 1984) (citation omitted) ("Moreover, Michigan Mutual as the primary liability insurer
owed to Hartford as the excess carrier the same duty to act in good faith which Michigan
owed to its own insureds."); Russo v. Rochford, 472 N.Y.S.2d 954, 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
("[tihe precedential value of the direct duty theory to Allstate, as excess carrier, is that its
rights and interest will not necessarily be dependent upon the conduct of Robert Clemente, the
insured, in exercising his obligation to cooperate with the primary insurer in his defense");
MAGARICK, supra note 62, at § 17.01.
124. See T. Richard Kennedy, Good Faith Principles Judicially Imposed in Dealings Be-
tween Primary and Excess Insurers and Reinsurers, 26 TORT & INs. L.J. 590, 591 (1991).
Notably, these carriers do negotiate and enter contracts of reinsurance. See, e.g., MAGARICK,
supra note 62, at § 17.01 (distinguishing excess insurance contracts from reinsurance policies).
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rangement. But this critical point has not deterred some tribunals from
allowing direct-action suits. Apparently, where courts have been unable to
identify the specific source and nature of the relationship, they canvass a
smorgasbord of legal jargon-such as "real party in interest" and "public
policy"-to uncover other reasons to justify their improbable direct-action
rulings. 125
Of course, other state supreme courts do permit a disgruntled excess car-
rier to recover extracontractual damages from a primary insurer on the the-
ory of equitable subrogation. 26 In fact, nearly all courts considering this
issue have held that equitable subrogation principles require the primary car-
rier to act responsibly toward the excess insurer as if the latter were the
insured.127 Courts adopting this rule disagree over the subissue of whether
125. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co., 356 N.W.2d at 651 (finding that the "judgment
creditor was a real party in interest and public policy dictated the allownace of a direct cause
of action").
126. See Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
("Equitable subrogation is a descendant of historic equity practice; it is utilized as a device to
achieve a just result by clothing a party with a right of recovery when he would otherwise be
defeated by lack of privity."), overruled on other grounds by Commercial Union Assur. Co. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal. 1980); Meyer Koulish Co. v. Cannon, 28 Cal. Rptr.
757, 760 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see also Anthony M. Lanzone and Stephen G. Ringel,
Duties of a Primary Insurer to an Excess Insurer, 61 NEB. L. REV. 259, 263-69 (1982) (same).
127. See MAGARICK, supra note 62, at § 17.04 ("It is ... almost universally accepted that
the primary carrier owes the same duty of good faith to the excess insurer by way of equitable
subrogation .... "); SHERNOFF, supra note 42, at § 2.03[3][c] ("[T]he primary insurer's duty to
act in good faith toward an excess insurer is generally the same as the duty owed by the
primary insurer to the insured, on the theory that the excess insurer is 'in the shoes' of the
insured.").
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the "transfer-of-rights-and-duties" 1 21 or the "triangular reciprocity" 1 29 ap-
proach should dictate when an excess carrier can recover against the pri-
mary insurer.
The Supreme Court of California, for instance, has adopted the "transfer
rule." In Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,13° the
court observed that an excess carrier should be able to assert claims against a
primary carrier from whom an insured would have been able to recover. 
1 3 1
In Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp.,132 a California appellate court prof-
fered the triangular reciprocity approach. The court recognized a tripartite
duty of due care among the policyholder, the primary insurer, and the excess
128. See, e.g., Puritan Ins. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 76, 82 (3rd Cir.
1985) (applying the Pennsylvania law of equitable subrogation); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 792 P.2d 749, 754 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc) ("an excess carrier
is subrogated to the rights of the insured and has a cause of action against the primary insurer
.... This right is derivative of the contract between the insured and the primary carrier....
As subrogee, the excess insurer's rights are no greater than the insured's")(citations and foot-
note omitted); Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn.
1976) (holding that "an excess insurer is subrogated to the insured's rights against a primary
insurer for breach of the primary insurer's good-faith duty to settle"); Estate of Penn v. Amal-
gamated Gen. Agencies, 372 A.2d 1124, 1127 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (holding that a
primary insurer owes a duty to an excess carrier to negotiate a settlement within the policy's
limits); Home Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 327 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747- 48 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd
332 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (same); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 404 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1980) (holding that "an excess insurer is subrogated to the
insured's rights against a primary insurer and may maintain an action for breach of the pri-
mary carrier's good faith duty to settle and defend"). In Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v.
Centennial Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296 (Or. 1985), the court stated:
If the insured purchases excess coverage, he in effect substitutes an excess insurer for
himself. It follows that the excess insurer should assume the rights as well as the
obligations of the insured in that position .... [T]he rule is this: A primary insurer
owes an excess insurer essentially the same duty of due diligence in claims handling
and settlement negotiating it owes to an insured-due care under all the
circumstances.
Id. at 1301-02 (footnote omitted).
129. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
130. 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal. 1980).
131. Id. at 1041. The court reasoned:
Since the insured would have been able to recover from the primary carrier for a
judgment in excess of policy limits caused by the carrier's wrongful refusal to settle,
the excess carrier [who paid the extracontractual damages] stands in the shoes of the
insured and should be permitted to assert all claims against the primary carrier
which the insured himself could have asserted.
Id. (citation omitted) The California court also rejected the independent, direct-action ap-
proach by asserting that the equitable-subrogation transfer rule "does not rest upon the finding
of any separate duty owed to an excess insurance carrier." Id.
132. 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
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insurer as a basis for the excess carrier's recovery against both the primary
carrier and the insured. 33
Only a small minority of state supreme courts have recognized the merits
of the triangular reciprocity approach. A careful reading of both California
and Michigan Supreme Court decisions indicates that these courts have tac-
itly approved this method of resolving bad-faith conflicts between liability
carriers. 134 In any event, the current state of the law presents a major prob-
lem for excess carriers in California because the appellate courts continue to
employ both approaches to resolve bad-faith controversies.
Finally, at least one state supreme court has held that the standard subro-
gation clause in a liability policy permits an excess carrier to commence a
bad-faith tort action against the primary insurer. In Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Reserve Insurance Co.,' 31 the excess insurer sued the primary insurer to re-
cover extracontractual damages resulting from the primary carrier's alleged
negligent failure to settle within the underlying primary policy limits. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that "Allstate is entitled to bring
an action against Reserve on the basis of [the] assignment [subrogation]
clause."' 136 However, in the same decision, the court also maintained that
they did not perceive a "relationship between the two insurers which would
133. Id. at 365-67. The Spink court found:
as an indispensable element of the exess carrier's claim, equitable subrogation fails to
achieve evenhanded justice .... The buyer of separate primary and excess coverage
generally occupies relationships with two (or more) carriers .... They are ... fully
aware of their respective roles and of the significant differences in their obligations to
the insured for which greater or lesser premiums are charged. When an accident
occurs, they become totally aware of each other .... Each has a choice of mutual
support or naked self-interest. The law, then, would be unrealistic in demanding that
either carrier use the policyholder as its stepping stone to the assertion of a mutual
obligation to each other. Triangular reciprocity is far more rational.
Id. at 365. The court concluded that "[t]riangular reciprocity advances the public interest in
extrajudicial settlement." Id. at 367. See also Michael D. Gallagher and Edward C. German,
Resolution of Settlement Conflicts Among Insureds, Primary Insurers, and Excess Insurers.
Analysis of the Current State of the Law and Suggested Guidelines for the Future, 61 NEB. L.
REV. 284, 335-38 (1982); THEODORE J. Tucci, Note, Primary and Excess Insurers and Their
Common Insured: The Triangular Relationship With No Love Lost, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
265, 291-96 (1981).
134. Compare Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 393 N.W.2d 479
(Mich. 1986), where the court noted that "when the California Supreme Court affirmed the
decision in Safeway, it adopted the opinion of the Court of Appeals, but deleted that portion of
the Court of Appeals opinion which criticized Spink's recognition of triangular reciprocity."
Id. at 484. The court concluded "that the California Supreme Court has not ruled upon the
Spink doctrine of 'triangular reciprocity'." Id.
135. 373 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1976).
136. Id. at 340. The court reasoned that while "[oither courts have sustained the right of
excess insurers to maintain an action against the primary carrier under a theory of equitable
subrogation, . . . [w]e find it unnecessary to utilize a subrogation analysis in view of our rule
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impose directly upon Reserve a duty to exercise due care with regard to
Allstate."' 13
7
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire's dual holding in Allstate is pecu-
liar for two reasons. First, the court's failure to find the prerequisite rela-
tionship between the primary and excess carriers-which would have
permitted the latter insurer to commence a direct, independent negligence
action-ignores reality. More than likely, a commonsensical interpretation
of the standard subrogation clause would support this proposition: The very
presence of a subrogation clause in an underlying insurance contract imposes
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing upon the primary carrier to
protect the interests of a potential subrogee, an excess insurer. 38 In addi-
tion, a theory of contractual subrogation permits the inference that after an
assignment between an insured and an excess carrier is perfected, the in-
sured's rights and obligations transfer directly to the excess insurer.
Second, the holding is also odd because although many rights, claims and
obligations may be assigned, a few cannot. For example, it is a settled prin-
ciple of tort law that personal negligence actions are not assignable.139 Cer-
tainly, the majority on the New Hampshire Supreme Court understood this
well-known principle. Nevertheless, they ignored or dismissed the point to
fashion a profoundly implausible rule: the standard subrogation clause in an
underlying insurance contract allows an excess insurer to bring a negligence
action to recover extracontractual damages from a primary carrier.'40
For these reasons, Allstate is a poorly reasoned decision and adds more
confusion to an already complex and highly unintelligible body of law in-
volving bad-faith litigation. More significantly, this decision demonstrates
that tort claims of this sort are assignable as choses in action." Id. (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Buckeye Union Causualty Co., 105 N.E.2d
568, 572 (Ohio 1952) (recognizing the right of an excess insurer to recover from a primary
carrier where the contractual subrogation provision in the liability insurance policy permitted
the transfer of rights from the insured to the excess carrier).
139. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
140. Allstate, 373 A.2d at 340. However, the court failed to intelligibly address and ade-
quately define the nature and the source of the excess insurer's "personal injury." "Reserve
[argued] that under the circumstances presented in [the] case, the assignment [was] ineffective
because no cause of action accrues without injury." Id. (emphasis added). In a strained man-
ner, the court responded:
We cannot accept this argument as we have previously recognized that a cause of
action for negligent failure to settle is not dependent upon the insured's prior payment
or the certainty of his future payment of the judgment against him .... [Instead,] the
fundamental basis of the action for negligent failure to settle lies in the absolute control
over settlement given to the primary insurer by the insurance contract.
Id. at 340-41 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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that state supreme courts apply "pro-insured legal rules" to achieve specific
outcomes in a variety of insurance-related actions."14
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE DISPOSITION OF BAD-FAITH, BREACH-OF-
CONTRACT, BREACH-OF-IMPLIED-COVENANT-OF-GOOD-FAITH AND
EXCESS-LIABILITY ACTIONS IN STATE SUPREME COURTS
BETWEEN 1900 AND 1991
State supreme courts are unwittingly discriminating against litigants. In
particular, supreme court justices allow immaterial factors to influence the
disposition of insurance-related cases in which insureds charge primary car-
riers with the following violations: breaching insurance contracts; breaching
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing; engaging in a variety of
bad-faith activities; and refusing to indemnify or otherwise compensate in-
sureds for judgments which exceed policy limits.
Do extralegal factors, such as race, ethnicity, geographic origin, types of
federal circuits, region of country, gender or wealth, singularly influence or
determine the outcome of a legal action? Are such variables relevant if a suit
involves a civil or criminal matter, or if a court decides an action on proce-
dural or meritorious grounds? Moreover, is concern warranted if it is dis-
covered that after controlling for other relevant variables or issues, one's
geographic origin or legal status determines the disposition of state court
claims concerned? Finally, is anger justified upon learning that after con-
trolling for all other material factors, state courts are more likely to dismiss
female-initiated rather than male-initiated suits on procedural grounds?
The answer to each question is a resounding "yes." In fact, under these
scenarios, outrage is fitting because there is little, if any, relevant case law to
support or even to suggest one to expect such improbable outcomes. Yet, for
reasons unknown, several extralegal factors-those having no purposeful
connection with the merits of various types of insurance-related cases-are
systematically influencing the disposition of such cases in state supreme
courts.
This Part of the Article reports the results of an empirical investigation
and analysis of state supreme court cases involving bad-faith, good-faith, ex-
141. Compare Haley & Wolkin, supra note 9, at 719 n.18, where the commentators point
out that:
Most courts in bond coverage litigation have failed to draw the necessary distinction
between commercial and consumer transactions prevalent in other areas of law. Un-
til they do, bonding companies will consistently face extra-contractual claims from
well-heeled insureds .... There are . . . some encouraging signs that courts have
begun to distinguish between types of insureds in applying pro-insured legal rules.
Id. (emphasis added).
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cess-liability and breach-of-contract actions. The results are nothing short of
startling. Variables, which have little to do with the legal issues and theories
outlined in the pleadings, as well as factors over which litigants exercise little
or no control, significantly shape the likelihood of complaints of insureds,
insurers and excess insurers winning on the merits of receiving a favorable
outcome on procedural grounds. Even more egregious is the fact that this
phenomenon has continued in state supreme courts for nearly 100 years.142
This study examined over 500 state supreme court decisions and over 100
state appellate court cases. Table 1 illustrates some selected demographic
characteristics of litigants. First, nearly forty percent (38.5%) of all claims
involved automobile liability insurance. A statistically significant' 43 number
of business (26.5%) and property (22.5%) insurance claims appear, how-
ever, in appellate cases. More revealing, the overwhelming majority of
suits-nearly seventy percent (69.1%) overall-were initiated to protect
"'personal" interests, such as the insureds' and immediate family-members'
lives, health and personal effects. In fact, among state supreme court suits,
the percentage of "personal-insurance" claims is slightly higher (71.5%).
Conversely, among appellate cases, a significant number of actions were filed
to resolve both "commercial" (27.5%) and "residential" (15.7%)
controversies.
142. Efforts were made to locate and select every state supreme court decision reported
between 1900-91. In addition, the search was restricted to supreme court cases that involved
only the following "theories of recovery:" "bad faith," "breach of contract," "breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" and "excess liability." The investigation un-
covered 526 supreme court decisions.
For reasons explained below, see infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text, an additional
sample of 102 state appellate court cases were randomly selected, analyzed and included in the
study; these latter decisions also involved the previously mentioned "theories" of recovery.
Therefore, the database for this empirical study comprises 628 holdings. A copy of the au-
thor's database is available at the office of Catholic University Law Review.
143. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMPLAINANTS WHOSE BAD FAITH, BREACH OF
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH & EXCESS LIABILITY CLAIMS





Demographic Characteristics (N = 102) (N = 526) (N= 628)
Percent Percent Percent
Type of Insurance:
Automobile 33.3 39.5 38.5
Business 26.5* 18.8* 20.1
Health 7.80 13.5' 12.6
Property 22.5* 15.0" 16.2
Other 9.8 13.1 12.6
Interests Protected:
Commercial 27.5* 18.6** 20.1
Personal 59.9"* 71.5"* 69.1
Residential 15.7"* 9.9** 10.8
Region of Country:
East 19.6* 9.1* 10.8
Midwest 18.6 22.1 21.5
South 25.5** 35.0** 33.4
Southwest 10.8 10.8 10.8
West 25.5 23.0 23.4
Circuits:
Eighth 7.8* 13.7* 12.7
Ninth 19.6 18.8 18.9
Tenth 9.8 9.7 9.7
Eleventh 14.7 23.4* 22.0




Professionals) 17.6 12.7 13.5
Insured (Individuals) 47.1 54.6 53.3
Third Party 26.5 26.4 26.4
Excess Insurers 8.8 6.3 6.7
& Reinsurers





Demographic Characteristics (N = 102) (N= 526) (N= 628)
Percent Percent Percent
Types of Complaints:
Breach of Contract 10.8 10.6 10.7
Breach of Covenant of Good
Faith: 11.8 16.0 15.5
Excess Judgment 42.2*** 25.1*** 27.9
Failure to Defend Suit 9.8 9.7 9.7
Refusing to Settle a Claim 8.8 10.6 10.4
Refusing to Settle Within
Policy Limits 19.6 24.3 23.6
Refusing to Pay First
Party Claim 42.2 41.8 41.9
Refusing to Pay Third
Party Claim 34.3*** 17.3"** 20.1
Theories of Liability:
Bad Faith - Common Law 52.9* 62.2* 60.7
Bad Faith - Statute 1.0 4.8 4.1
Breach of Express Contract 31.4 28.1 28.7
Breach of Implied Covenant
of Good Faith 25.5 20.5 21.3
Extra-Contractual Liability 43.1 *** 12.7** 17.7
Grounds for Disposing
Actions in State Trial Courts:
Merit 58.8 58.7 58.8
Procedural 41.2 41.3 41.2
Disposition of Action at Trial
Stage From Complainants'
Perspectives:
Favorable Outcome 46.1 48.7 48.4
Unfavorable Outcome 53.9 51.3 51.6
Grounds for Disposing




Disposition of Action in State
Supreme Courts From
Complainants' Perspectives:
Favorable Outcome 46.2 46.2
Unfavorable Outcome - 53.8 53.8





A regional classification of cases also appears in Table 1. First, a slight
majority of all suits originated in the South (33.4%),'" and an even larger
number of suits were appealed to supreme courts in the South (35.0%).
Also, among state supreme court cases, twenty-two (22.1%) percent were
filed in the Midwest.' 45 In addition, among state appellate and supreme
courts, an identical number of filings were made in the Southwest. 146 Fur-
thermore, among cases originating in the West,' 47 nearly equal numbers of
filings were resolved in appellate (25.5%) and supreme courts (23.0%).
Clearly, cases originating in the East 48 were more likely to be resolved in
state appellate courts (19.6%) rather than in state supreme courts (9.1%).
A few other relevant findings also appear in Table 1. First, among both
appellate (47.1%) and supreme court (54.6%) decisions, the majority of
complainants are insured individuals; the second largest category overall is
comprised of third parties (26.4%); insured businesses and corporations
formed the third largest category at 13.5%; and excess insurers comprise
nearly seven percent (6.7%) of all complainants.
Second, when comparing appellate and supreme court complainants, the
former are significantly more likely to complain about excess-judgment ver-
dicts (42.2%) and about insurance carriers' refusal to pay third-party claims
(34.3%). Conversely, supreme court complainants are slightly more likely to
complain about insurers' breach of the covenant of good faith (16.0%) and
about carriers' refusal to settle claims within policy limits (24.3%).
Third, appellate and supreme court complainants proffered very different
theories of recovery. The latter were significantly more likely to cite a com-
mon law theory of bad faith to justify a favorable recovery-62.2% versus
52.9%. By contrast, appellate court petitioners were significantly more
likely to cite excess-liability principles to secure a favorable decision-43. 1%
versus 12.7%.
Finally, Table 1 reveals that among state supreme court cases, the courts
decided the majority of suits on the merits (62.7%). Additionally, both over-
all and from the perspective of supreme court complainants, the majority of
plaintiffs received "unfavorable" decisions (53.8%). Furthermore, that fig-
144. The southern states included Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Kentucky,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
145. The midwestern states included Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
146. The southwestern states included Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas.
147. The western states included Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
148. The eastern jurisdictions included Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Vermont.
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ure nearly mirrors the "unfavorable" outcome rate (51.3%) appearing in
state trial courts between 1900-91.
A. The Effects of Region of the Country and Types of Federal Circuits on
the Disposition of Suits in State Supreme Courts
The data in Table 2 depicts the relationship between region of the country
and the disposition of various insurance claims in state supreme courts be-
TABLE 2. DISPOSITION OF BREACH-OF-CONTRACT, BAD-FAITH,
BREACH-OF-COVENANT-OF-GOOD-FAITH & EXCESS-
LIABILITY CLAIMS IN STATE SUPREME COURTS BETWEEN
1900 AND 1991 BY REGION OF COUNTRY (N=526)
Region of Country
Eastern Midwestern Southern Southwestern Western
Disposition Supreme Supreme Supreme Supreme Supreme
of Claims Courts Courts Courts Courts Courts
Favorable 18 53 73 31 68
Outcomes for
Complainants (37.5) (45.7) (39.7) (54.4) (56.2)
Unfavorable 30 63 111 26 53
Outcomes for
Complainants (62.5) (54.3) (60.3) (45.6) (43.8)
TOTAL 48 116 184 57 121
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Chi Square = 11.029; df = 4
Level of statistical significance: p < .01
tween 1900-91. The Chi square statistic (11.029) is statistically significant at
a probability level 149 of p <.01. Simply stated, this finding indicates that for
unknown reasons, region of the country influences whether complainants
receive favorable or unfavorable decisions in state supreme courts. Specifi-
cally, plaintiffs are more likely to prevail if their actions are decided in
supreme courts located in the West (56.2%) and Southwest (54.4%). Con-
versely, complainants are significantly more likely to lose if their complaints
are adjudicated in either eastern (62.5%), midwestern (54.3%) or southern
(60.3%) supreme courts.
149. See Willy E. Rice, Judicial Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws: An Analysis of Some
Unexamined Problems that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983 Would Eliminate, 27
How. L.J. 227, 253-55 & nn. 16-162 (1984) (outlining the computation of chi square) [hereinaf-
ter Rice, Fair Housing].
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The percentages appearing in Table 2 arguably indicate that state supreme
courts are either "pro-insured" or "pro-insurer." Notwithstanding the re-
sults of this survey, other reasons may explain why state supreme courts
reach conflicting results. Perhaps the statistical findings reflect nothing
more than the differential application of settled principles of contract and
tort law among sister states. Or, conceivably, the data may demonstrate that
various exceptions to settled principles have developed within various re-
gions of the country. Complainants' probability of success in a particular
jurisdiction, therefore, may reflect these factors rather than intentional or
unintentional judicial bias.
Some support for this method of reasoning appears in Table 3, which
presents the statistically significant relationship between types of federal cir-
TABLE 3. DISPOSITION OF BREACH-OF-CONTRACT, BAD-FAITH,
BREACH-OF-COVENANT-OF-GOOD-FAITH & EXCESS-
LIABILITY CLAIMS IN STATE SUPREME COURTS BETWEEN
1900 AND 1991 BY TYPES OF FEDERAL CIRCUITS (N= 526)
Types of Federal Circuits
Supreme Suprem Supreme Supreme Supreme
Courts Courts Courts Courts Courts
Within The Within The Within The Within The Within
Disposition Eighth Ninth Tenth Eleventh Other
of Claims Circuit Circuit Circuit Circuit Circuits
Favorable 26 56 26 39 96
Outcomes for
Complainants (36.1) (56.6) (51.0) (31.7) (53.0)
Unfavorable 46 43 25 84 85
Outcomes for
Complainants (63.9) (43.4) (49.0) (68.3) (47.0)
TOTAL 72 99 51 123 181
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Chi Square = 21.496; df = 4
Level of statistical significance: p < .0001
cuits and the disposition of claims. The findings in this table are similar to
those reported in Table 2. Among the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, com-
prised primarily of midwestern and southern states, complainants are signifi-
cantly more likely to lose in state supreme courts, the percentages being
63.9% and 68.3%, respectively. Conversely, the majority of states in the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits are western states, and within these circuits, com-
plainants are more likely to win.
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Again, an investigation of the development of common law tort and con-
tract principles, within and among these distinct geographic areas, failed to
reveal any sound support for such regional differences. In fact, a careful
analysis of the data illustrated in Table 4 severely undermines the argument
TABLE 4. DISPOSITION OF BAD FAITH, COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH &




Region of Disposition of Claims Number (Degrees of
Country State Supreme Courts From Complainants' View of Cases Freedom)
Favorable Unfavorable
Percent Percent
Midwest Iowa 21.7 78.3 (N=23) 6.632***
Wisconsin 51.9 48.1 (N=27) (df= 2)
Other Courts 51.5 48.5 (N= 66)
South Alabama 35.6 71.1 (N=90) 9.864***
Georgia 40.0 60.0 (N = 20) (df= 3)
Mississippi 57.1 42.9 (N=21)
Other Courts 50.9 49.1 (N=53)
Southwest Arkansas 33.3 66.7 (N= 18) 7.380***
Oklahoma 50.0 50.0 (N = 18) (df=2)
Other Courts 76.2 23.8 (N=21)
West Arizona 66.7 33.3 (N=21) 7.688**
California 84.6 15.4 (N = 13) (df= 3)
Montana 40.9 59.1 (N=22)
Other Courts 53.3 47.7 (N = 65)
Levels of statistical significance:
p < .01
p < .05
t Forty-eight (48) "Eastern Supreme Court" cases are not included because the cell sizes are too
small.
that complainants' likelihood of winning or losing is not significantly influ-
enced by the geographic location of state supreme courts. Clearly, disparate-
impact discrimination is at work in supreme courts among sister states.
For example, in the Midwest, complainants are substantially more likely
to lose in the Iowa Supreme Court (78.3%), but they are more likely to win
in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (51.9%) and in other midwestern
supreme courts (51.5%). Similarly, disparate results also appear among
southern supreme courts. For instance, if bad-faith, breach-of-contract,
breach-of-covenant-of-good-faith and excess-liability disputes are resolved in
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the Supreme Courts of Alabama and Georgia, plaintiffs' risk of losing is sub-
stantial-7 1.1% and 60.0%, respectively. By contrast, aggrieved parties are
slightly more likely to win in the Mississippi Supreme Court (57.1%) and in
the remainder of southern supreme courts (50.9%).
Finally, unwarranted disparate-impact discrimination also appears among
southwestern and western courts. Specifically, within the western region of
the country, complainants are more likely to lose in the Supreme Court of
Montana (59.1%). In all other western courts, however, aggrieved parties
are more likely to win. This is especially true for parties whose complaints
originated in California, whose supreme court is more likely to rule in favor
of aggrieved parties nearly eighty-five (84.6%) percent of the time.
B. The Effects of Types of Insurance Contracts and Types of
Complainants on the Disposition of Suits
in State Supreme Courts
At this juncture, a question arises concerning what is especially unique
about automobile-insurance policies that would cause courts to rule system-
atically in favor of or against the owners of such contracts. Expressed an-
other way, do health-insurance policies contain some exceedingly
uncommon or legally material attributes that require apparently impartial
courts to issue unwarranted, disparate decisions? Of course, the answer is
"no." An exhaustive search of relevant common law principles failed to un-
cover a single credible reason to attach any legal significance to a particular
type of insurance contract. This is especially true when courts apply con-
tractual principles to resolve breach-of-contract or breach-of-good-faith-and-
fair-dealing controversies.
Yet, a careful examination of the percentages reported in Table 5 reveals
that state supreme courts are unwittingly permitting types of insurance con-
tracts to influence their decisions. Table 5 illustrates the disposition of
claims among complainants who were successful at trial. Although the ma-
jority of all complainants received favorable outcomes, some plaintiffs were
more or less successful depending upon the type of their insurance policy.
For example, complainants were significantly more likely to prevail if the
conflict was over business-insurance policies (78.3%); however, if automo-
bile policies were at issue, complainants were only slightly more likely to
receive a favorable decision (51.5%).
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TABLE 5. DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE-LITIGATION CLAIMS IN STATE
SUPREME COURTS BETWEEN 1900 AND 1991 BY TYPES OF
INSURANCE POLICIES-AMONG COMPLAINANTS WHO WERE
SUCCESSFUL IN THE TRIAL COURTS (N=256)
Types of Insurance Policies
Disposition Automobile Business Health Property Other
of Claims Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance Types*
Favorable 52 36 26 22 22
Outcomes for
Complainants (51.5) (78.3) (65.0) (64.7) (62.9)
Unfavorable 49 10 14 12 13
Outcomes for
Complainants (48.5) (21.7) (35.0) (35.3) (37.1)
TOTAL 101 46 40 34 35
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Chi Square = 10.134; df = 4
Level of statistical significance: p = .03
* The following types of policies are included: Malpractice; Trip; Annuity; Hail and Crop.
Even if the evidence appearing in Tables 2-5 does not conclusively estab-
lish that state supreme courts are engaging in disparate-impact discrimina-
tion, perhaps the findings are more convincing in Table 6, which presents the
statistically significant relationship between the disposition of actions and
the types of complainants. Incidentally, the relationship appears among
plaintiffs who accused primary insurers of breaching an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
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TABLE 6. DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE-LITIGATION CLAIMS IN STATE
SUPREME COURTS BETWEEN 1900 AND 1991 BY TYPES OF
COMPLAINANTS - AMONG COMPLAINANTS WHO
COMMENCED THEIR CAUSES OF ACTIONS UNDER A




Disposition Insureds Insureds (Reinsurers &
of Claims (Non-Individuals) (Individuals) Third Party* Excess Insurers)
Favorable 5 42 14 3
Outcomes for
Complainants (35.7) (73.7) (50.0) (33.3)
Unfavorable 9 15 14 6
Outcomes for
Complainants (64.3) (26.3) (50.0) (66.7)
TOTAL 14 57 28 9
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Chi Square = 11.627; df = 3
Level of statistical significance: p < .001
* The following are included in this category: Agents; Administrators; Assignees; Beneficiaries;
Creditors; Judgment Creditors; Receivers; Trustees; Partners; & Uninsureds
Surprisingly, and without any apparent legal basis, state supreme courts
are likely to rule in favor of insureds (73.7% of the time) if the insureds are
individual policyholders. In contrast, if the complaining insureds are not
individuals, such as associations, partnerships, municipalities, corporations,
or small enterprises, the insureds are significantly more likely to lose
(64.3%). Also, complainants are significantly more likely to lose if they are
excess insurers or reinsurers (66.7%).
Why are state supreme courts discriminating among types of insureds?
Many legal scholars, jurists and practitioners agree that an individual con-
sumer "who obtains an insurance policy is entitled to some degree of judicial
protection, [but] an insurer who obtains a reinsurance contract is not entitled
to that same degree of judicial protection since there is generally no disparity
between the bargaining power of the reinsured and the reinsurer." 5° Such
150. Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 854, 857 (Idaho 1984) (emphasis added);
see Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. 1981) ("Recognizing the dispar-
ity in the bargaining positions of the companies which write insurance and the consumers who
buy the policies, both the statutory law and judicial decisions have aimed at making certain
that the interests of every insured are protected") (emphasis added).
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sentiment partially explains why reinsurers or excess insurers are more likely
to be unsuccessful against primary carriers in state supreme courts.
This disparity-in-bargaining-power analysis does not adequately explain
or justify the incidence of disparate-impact discrimination appearing among
various types of insureds. This view is proffered because conceivably every
insured's bargaining position is somewhat inferior to that of primary insur-
ers. By all objective measures, insurance companies are extremely powerful
bargainers. 151
More important, for years state supreme courts have employed the "tradi-
tional theory" of strict contractual construction, 152 the "doctrine of ambigu-
ity,"' 15a and the "theory of reasonable expectation '  to resolve disputes
151. For example, in Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 562 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977) (citation
omitted), the Supreme Court of Oregon noted that:
the huge financial reserves of large insurance companies give them an advantageous
bargaining position when dealing with injured policyholders who are suddenly faced
with the ruinous bills which they purchased insurance to avoid.... [S]ome insurance
companies have taken advantage of this superior bargaining position and have sought
to force their insureds [apparently without distinguishing among types] to settle for
significantly less than they were entitled to through deliberate patterns of harassment
and delay.
Id. at 968-69 n.5.
152. The "traditional" approach requires a court to examine the "four corners" of an in-
surance contract and interpret the language according to common law contract principles.
See, e.g., Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 210 S.E.2d 187, 189 (N.C. 1974) (" 'where the lan-
guage of an insurance policy is plain, unambiguous, and susceptible of only one reasonable
construction, the courts will enforce that contract according to its terms.' " (emphasis added)
(quoting Walsh v. Insurance Co., 144 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1965)); Brown v. Equitable Life Ins.
Co., 211 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Wis. 1973) (stressing that "the theory of strict contractual con-
struction of insurance contracts followed by a majority of jurisdictions is consistent with the
philosphy of this court. 'Contracts of insurance rest upon and are controlled by the same princi-
ples of law that are applicable to other contracts." (emphasis added) (quoting McPhee v. Ameri-
can Motorist's Ins. Co., 205 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Wis. 1973)).
153. Some courts view insurance policies as contracts of adhesion. These tribunals con-
strue ambiguities in favor of insureds. The insured's legal status or economic or personal
characteristics are therefore unimportant. Cf Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal.
1966) ("[A] contract entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining strength ...
written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and offered to the weaker party
on a 'take it or leave it basis' carries some consequences that extend beyond orthodox [contrac-
tual] implications"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346, 347 (Nev. 1967) (explaining
that insurance contracts are "complex instrument[s], unilaterally prepared, and seldom under-
stood by the assured").
154. See FISCHER & SWISHER, supra note 116, at 2, advancing the proposition that:
The basis of [the reasonable expectation] theory is two fold: (1) that an insurer
should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance transaction; and (2)
that the 'reasonable expectations' of the insured should be honored, even when these
expectations vary from express provisions in the insurance contract, and even though




between insureds and primary insurers. These tribunals rarely made distinc-
tions or weighed obvious differences among various insureds to reach sound
legal decisions. In fact, for nearly 100 years state supreme courts consist-
ently refused to make such differentiation... and did so only when statutory
law compelled it. ' 5
6
Nevertheless, these research findings are statistically significant and, ar-
guably, quite compelling. Apparently, state supreme court justices uninten-
tionally allow the types of insureds (complainants) to influence the
disposition of bad-faith, extra-contractual liability, breach-of-good-faith, and
breach-of-contract actions.
C. A Multivariate Probit Two-Stage Analysis of the Disposition of
Insurance-Related Cases in State Supreme Courts, 1900-1991
Are state supreme courts truly biased against insureds who are not indi-
viduals and against policyholders who purchase health insurance rather than
business insurance? Or, do the supreme courts of Arizona, California, Mis-
sissippi and Wisconsin favor aggrieved parties who complain about bad-faith
rather than breach-of-contract violations? Or, are the Supreme Courts of
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia and Iowa "pro-insurer" rather than "pro-con-
sumer" courts?
Id.; see also Storms v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978) ("6If
a policy is so constructed that a reasonable man in the position of the insured would not
attempt to read it, the insured's reasonable expectations will not be delimited by the policy
language, regardless of the clarity of particular phrase among the Augean stable of print").
155. See Haley & Wolkin, supra note 9, at 719 n.18. ("There are ... some encouraging
signs that courts have begun to distinguish between types of insureds in applying ... legal
rules"). See generally, Barry R. Ostrager & David W. Ichel, The Role of Bargaining Power
Evidence in the Construction of the Business Insurance Policy: An Update, 18 FORUM 577
(1983). The reason that courts have not been, and need not be, concerned about distinguishing
among the types of insureds should be fairly obvious. By all objective criteria, it is, or should
be legally immaterial whether an insured is a private individual, a general or limited partner,
an association, a professional or a "mom-and-pop" business. Moreover, strict rules of contract
do not require courts to consider the attributes of parties to an insurance contract. But see
Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1352-53 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1089 (1979) ("The traditional contractual approach fails to consider the true nature of the
relationship between the insurer and its insureds. Only through the recognition that insurance
contracts are not freely negotiated agreements ... and that the insured cannot 'bargain' .
does our analysis approach the realities of an insurance transaction").
156. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 462 So. 2d 346, 349 (Ala. 1984)
(repeating its ruling in State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 So. 2d 95, 98 (Ala. 1974)
("the legislature intended to draw a distinction between the two types of insureds, and did
indeed intend to require uninsured motorist coverage for the broader class 'persons insured
thereunder' "); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Barker, 451 So. 2d 731, 732 (Miss. 1984) ("[t]he
statutes and authorities are clear that there are two separate and distinct types of insureds
under uninsured motorist coverage and the terms of these statutes are incorporated in all mo-
tor vehicle policies where uninsured motorist coverage is provided").
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Apparently, these supreme tribunals are biased and are intentionally or
unintentionally permitting extralegal factors to influence the outcome of ex-
cess-liability, bad-faith, breach-of-contract and breach-of-good-faith suits.
An examination of Tables 2-6 support such an inference.
Possibly, a less obvious statistical aberration might be causing the appar-
ent judicial bias or unwarranted, disparate-impact discrimination. Alterna-
tively, each reported "significant" extralegal factor may be masking the
influence of an even more obscure, significant legal factor which has not
been measured and assessed in this study. Stated differently, some other un-
derlying, material legal factor which is highly "correlated" with these "im-
permissible" variables may be producing, arguably, unusual statistical
findings.
For example, Table 7 presents the relationship between types of disposi-
tions and various theories of recovery. Not surprisingly, the relationship is
TABLE 7. DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE - LITIGATION CLAIMS IN
STATE SUPREME COURTS BETWEEN 1900 AND 1991 BY




Breach of an Breach of an
Contract: Implied Implied
Breach of Covenant of Covenant of Tort:
Express Good Faith Good Faith Independent
Disposition Terms & & Fair & Fair Tort of Bad Other Legal
of Claims Conditions Dealing Dealing Faith Theories*
Favorable 61 54 26 91 11
Outcomes for
Complainants (41.2) (62.1) (44.8) (44.0) (42.3)
Unfavorable 87 33 32 116 15
Outcomes for
Complainants (58.8) (37.9) (55.2) (56.0) (57.7)
TOTAL 148 87 58 207 26
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Chi Square = 10.913; df = 4
Level of statistical significance: p < .01
* These are: Intentional Torts; Negligence; Fraud; Equity; Civil RICO; Violations of Unfair
Claims Practice Statutes; and Violations of Business Practices Acts.
statistically significant. The results show that complainants are significantly
more likely to win when primary insurers are accused of breaching an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (62.1%). However, complain-
Judicial Bias
ants are more likely to lose when breach-of-express-contract (58.8%), tort-
of-bad-faith (55.2%), excess-judgment (56.0%) and other legal actions
(57.7%) are filed.
What are the "true" predictors of judicial outcomes in state supreme
courts? Are the extralegal variables reported above more important? Or,
are types of legal theories more relevant? Without further analysis, a conclu-
sive answer cannot be presented.
The results illustrated in Table 8 raise similar questions. Here, several
statistically significant relationships appear between selected demographic
characteristics and the grounds for disposing state supreme court cases.
First, complainants are significantly more likely to be unsuccessful when
cases are decided on procedural grounds (61.5%). It is also evident, how-
ever, that failure-to-settle suits, as well as suits originating in Wisconsin and
in Alabama, are more likely to be resolved procedurally; the respective per-
centages are 52.8%, 63.0%, and 43.3%. Conversely, excess-judgment and
failure-to-defend cases, along with cases originating in Iowa, Georgia and
other midwestern and southern supreme courts, are considerably more likely
to be decided on the merits.
As noted, many of these same demographic characteristics are closely as-
sociated with judicial outcomes. These characteristics also influence
whether state supreme court actions are disposed of procedurally or on the
merits. The task, therefore, of deciphering the true predictors of judicial
outcomes is complicated by the unexpected revelation that complainants'
likelihood of winning or losing a case is significantly related to whether
courts decide cases on meritorious or procedural grounds. At this juncture,
however, it is unclear whether extralegal or legal factors are more relevant.
Finally, a phenomenon called "self-selectivity bias"I57 may be causing dis-
parate-impact discrimination. Such bias often arises in samples because of
the differences between those who decide to commence, for example, bad-
faith or breach-of-contract actions, and those who decide not to initiate such
actions. Alternatively, an otherwise fairly random sample of breach-of-
good-faith cases may be comprised primarily of aggrieved individuals who
decided to file suits in state courts and decided to appeal adverse trial-court
157. See, e.g., G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN
ECONOMETRICS, 257-89 (1983). For examples of, and tests for, self-selectivity bias from a
legal point of view, see Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Individual
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act and Under the Labor-Management Relations
Act Between 1935 and 1990 - An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Unsettled Intercircuit
and Intracircuit Conflicts, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 653, 730-34 (1991) [hereinafter Rice, Enforce-
ment Under the Labor Acts], and Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of
Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove-City Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219,
279-82 (1986) [hereinafter Rice, Grove-City Analysis].
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decisions to a state appellate or supreme court, if they were the losing
parties.
Self-selection bias might also appear in another form.158 Complainants
who were successful at trial level would have no reason to appeal to a state
supreme court, and therefore would not appear in a particular sample of
cases. They would have excluded themselves from the original pool of dis-
gruntled complainants. Under either scenario an otherwise fairly random
sample would be unscientific, and it would be highly improper to conclude
that judicial bias is producing the disparate-impact discrimination. Thus, a
test is required to determine whether selectivity bias is evident in the sample.
Table 9 displays the results of a multivariate probit two-stage analysis."5 9
This statistical technique answers two important questions. First, does a sta-
tistically significant amount of self-selectivity bias appear in a sample? Sec-
ond, are the simultaneous and multiple effects of extralegal and legal factors
on the disposition of insurance-related, state supreme court actions statisti-
cally meaningful, if selectivity bias is absent?" 6
The multivariate probit coefficients appearing in the "Decision-to-Ap-
peal" column provide the answer to the question whether any of the selected
"predictors," such as types of insurance or complainants, explain who is
more likely to appeal an insurance-related case to a state supreme court.
The answer is none of the probit coefficients are statistically relevant. Put
differently, this probit procedure-which controls for the independent as
well as the multiple, simultaneous effects of allfactors-failed to uncover any
158. See Rice, Enforcement Under the Labor Acts, supra note 157, at 733.
Additionally, the difference between litigants' financial resources is often another
source of selectivity bias because a positive relationship exits [sic] between the level of
one's financial resources and one's ability to purchase good legal representation.
Therefore, a finding that [complainants are more or less likely to win in state
supreme courts] could be a reflection of differential access to adequate resources
rather than a reflection of judicial bias.
Id.
159. This procedure has been fairly discussed elsewhere. See Rice, Enforcement Under the
Labor Acts, supra note 157, at 733 & n.491; Rice, Grove-City Analysis, supra note 157, at 286-
87 & nn. 406-10.
160. Before answering these questions, some preliminary comments are warranted. First,
several "predictor" variables appear in the extreme left column of Table 9. These statistically
significant "predictors," have been seen before and are illustrated separately in Tables 3, 5, 6
and 7. The importance of these factors is assessed here because of their singular and significant
influence upon the disposition of excess-liability, breach-of-contract, bad-faith, and other types
of insurance-related cases.
Second, all 628 complainants within the sample appealed their actions to a state appellate
court. Of this group, 526 aggrieved litigants decided to obtain additional review in a state
supreme court, while 102 complainants decided not to pursue further review in a supreme
court.
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meaningful differences between those who decided to seek review in a state
supreme court and those who did not.
The information appearing in the two "Disposition-of-Bad-Faith" col-
umns in the center of Table 9 answer the two original questions. First, the
statistically insignificant lambda term (.2354) reveals the absence of self-se-
lectivity bias in the sample of 526 supreme court cases. This coefficient also
means that certain distinctive attributes of aggrievants seeking supreme
court review are less likely to influence judicial decisions.
Second, three statistically significant probit coefficients appear under the
heading of "Disposition of Bad Faith." The negative 1.6390 probit term
indicates that complainants who commence a breach-of-contract action are
significantly more likely to lose in state supreme courts. In contrast, the
positive .4748 coefficient suggests that complainants are more likely to win if
state trial courts decide those cases on the merits.
The latter finding is not dramatic. In fact, it illustrates that trial court
determinations will remain intact, unless the court abuses its discretion. 16 1
That aggrievants are more likely to lose a breach-of-contract action in state
supreme courts is curious, however, because the finding deviates considera-
bly both from the pro-consumer dicta in supreme court opinions and from
scholarly analyses in insurance-related law review articles.' 62
161. See, e.g., Barnett, v. Arkansas Transp. Co., 798 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Ark. 1990) (holding
that an abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review); Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
463 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 1990) (same); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 531
(Wash. 1990) (same).
162. See, e.g., Lightner v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 744 P.2d 840, 845 (Kan. 1987) ("An
insurance contract is generally liberally construed against the insurer .... The basis for con-
struing an insurance policy against the insurer in close cases is simply the rule of contracts that
the drafter must suffer the consequences of not making the terms clear") (emphasis added);
Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1089 (1979) ("Courts should be concerned with assuring that the insurance purchasing pub-
lic's reasonable expectations are fulfilled. Thus, regardless of the ambiguity ... inherent in a
given set of insurance documents ... the public has a right to expect that they will receive
something of comparable value in return for the premium paid") (emphasis added); Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1174-80
(1983) (arguing that the terms in form contracts, like insurance policies, should be presump-
tively invalid, because consumers often do not read form insurance contracts and such con-
tracts do not permit consumers to give or withhold meaningful consent to the terms of
contracts of adhesion); see also Young, supra note 17, at 71.
[C]ourts ... have historically viewed insurance policies as but another form of con-
tract, and consequently have, at least ostensibly, construed them according to rules
of construction applicable to contracts generally. At the same time, the courts have
increasingly recognized that an inflexible application of these rules would result in an
'unjust' decision. In order to protect the weaker party, the policyholder, while purport-





The third statistically meaningful finding, however, is both surprising and
egregious. The negative .6368 probit coefficient reveals that state supreme
courts permit the type of insurance contract to influence the disposition of
bad-faith, breach-of-good-faith, breach-of-contract and excess-judgment ac-
tions. Specifically, purchasers of property-insurance-such as homeowner's,
flood and earthquake coverage-are substantially more likely to lose than
consumers who purchase other types of policies. Again, this finding is ex-
ceptional, because it occurs even after the effects of other legal and extralegal
factors are held constant. Moreover, the finding is unwarranted, because
common law contractual principles neither mandate nor suggest such an im-
probable result.
Finally, the data presented in the last two columns of Table 9 suggest that
state supreme courts practice unwarranted, disparate-impact discrimination.
There, two statistically significant factors are evident. 163 The negative
1.5292 coefficient reconfirms the earlier finding that complainants who com-
mence breach-of-contract actions are more likely to lose. Likewise, plaintiffs
who initiate excess-judgment actions are more likely to lose. The statisti-
cally meaningful probit coefficient is negative 1.330.
The latter findings are particularly vexatious for two reasons. First, as the
heading over the last two columns indicates, these results appear among
complainants who prevailed in state trial courts. To comport with the previ-
ously discussed findings, this subgroup of aggrievants should have been suc-
cessful. As noted, state trial court deliberations are not reversed, absent an
abuse of discretion.'" More important, these unique statistical outcomes
only appear among complainants whose claims involved "personal" insur-
ance. '65 In addition, neither common law contractual principles, the doc-
trine of ambiguity, the doctrine of reasonable expectation, nor the common
law doctrine of bad faith supports or causes one to expect such improbable
outcomes in state supreme courts.
16 6
D. Recommendations to Cure the Disparate Treatment of Aggrievants
Whose Insurance-Related Claims are Resolved in
State Supreme Courts
This Article demonstrates that state supreme courts are inhospitable fo-
rums for resolving insurance-related bad-faith, breach-of-contract, breach-
of-covenant-of-good-faith and excess-liability claims. Briefly stated, too
163. Notably, the test for self-selectivity bias is insignificant.
164. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
165. See Table I and the accompanying discussion.
166. See generally supra notes 53-60, 152-54 and accompanying text.
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many state supreme courts either fail or refuse to clearly identify the requi-
site elements that a complainant must prove to prevail, for example, in a
bad-faith cause of action. Often these supreme tribunals simply conclude
that "bad faith" was or was not present. Notably, it is rare for a state
supreme court to outline a sound methodology that would help lower courts
resolve bad-faith as well as breach-of-good-faith and excess-liability actions.
Additionally, in many states the standard of care to which primary insur-
ance carriers must conform is not clear. For example, some supreme courts
apply and condone the use of both a negligence and an intent standard to
resolve bad-faith conflicts.' 67 Other courts "adopt" a "fairly debatable" or
"arguably debatable" standard to resolve various controversies.' 68 Appar-
ently, state supreme courts "adopt" or manufacture a myriad of ambiguous
and conflicting standards without addressing the manner in which lower
state courts should interpret and apply such standards. In addition, state
supreme courts apply various legal principles inconsistently, making it diffi-
cult to predict whether a case will be decided on the merits or on procedural
grounds, or to predict whether a complainant will win or lose.
The survey's most significant finding centers on the way state supreme
courts permit immaterial evidence to influence the disposition of insurance-
related actions. Purchasers of insurance products should not receive
favorable outcomes in state supreme courts simply because they accused pri-
mary carriers of violating some principle of law. Moreover, supreme court
judges should not--either intentionally or unintentionally-permit irrele-
vant factors to shape their decisions.
What should be done to remedy the problems uncovered here? First, con-
sumers who complain about the types of insurance-related violations dis-
cussed in this Article should be prevented from obtaining judicial review of
bad-faith, excess-liability, breach-of-contract and breach-of-good-faith ac-
tions in state supreme courts. Second, an outright bar upon these types of
suits from all state courts would be an even more appropriate response; an
administrative rather than a judicial proceeding is a better forum for resolv-
ing insurance disputes because these disputes often require "expert" atten-
tion.' 69 Thus, submitting an insurance-law controversy to a highly trained
and experienced state administrative law judge (ALJ) better serves the inter-
est of all parties.
167. See supra notes 48, 51-52.
168. See supra notes 46, 47.
169. See Rice, Enforcement Under the Labor Acts, supra note 157, at 734-37; Rice, Fair
Housing, supra note 149, at 271-74; Rice, Grove-City Analysis, supra note 157, at 281-82.
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A majority of states 7 ° have adopted either all, or substantial portions of
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) model legis-
lation, which proscribes egregious claims-settlement acts as well as unfair
and deceptive practices. 171 In particular, section 4(9) of the Model Act pro-
hibits insurance carriers from engaging in a variety of acts that violate poli-
cyholders' reasonable expectations. 72 More important, the Model Act's
170. The following state statutes are substantially identical to Section 4(9) of the Model
Act: ALA. CODE § 27-12-24 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-461 (1990); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-66-206 (Michie 1987); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 790.03(h) (Deering 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(h) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-61(6) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(16) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN
§ 626.9541(9) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 431:13-103(a)(10) (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 41-1329 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1.5 (Burns 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 507B.4(9) (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(9); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 176D,
§ 3 (West 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2026 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72A.20 (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.936(10) (Vernon 1991); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 33-18-201 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1525(9) (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.310
(1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4 (1983); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:29B-4(9) (1985); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-20 (Michie 1988); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601 (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-54.4(11) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(9) (1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36,
§ 1222 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.230 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5(a)(10)
(1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104(8) (1989); TEXAS REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21-2
(West 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-26-303 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4729(9)
(1992); VA. CODE ANN § 38.2-510 (Michie 1990); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1992); Wyo.
INS. CODE § 26-13-124 (1991).
The following statutes are somewhat similar to the Model Act. They prohibit unfair and
deceptive acts and practices; however, claims-settlement practices are not clearly mandated:
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.6 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230 (Baldwin 1987);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2164-D (West
1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 213 (1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-5-33 (1972); OHIO
REV. CODE. ANN. § 3901.19 (Baldwin 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-59-20 (Law. Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-33-66 (1990); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.010 (West 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 628.46 (West Supp. 1991).
As of this writing, the District of Columbia, Georgia and Rhode Island have not enacted
statutes which are either identical or substantially similar to the Model Act.
171. AN ACT RELATING TO UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR AND DE-
CEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE § 4 (9) (National Ass'n of
Ins. Comm'rs 1972) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The full text of the 1985 version appears in
Bad Faith and Punitive Damages: Annotations to First-Party Insurance Cases, Statutes, and
Regulations, 1986 A.B.A. COMM. PROP. INS. L. & SEC. TORT & INS. PRAC. 337-48 [hereinaf-
ter A.B.A. Bad-Faith Annotations].
172. The California legislature has enacted California Insurance Code § 790.03(h), which
is substantially similar to § 4(9) of the Model Act. See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 592 P.2d 329, 331 n. 1 (Cal. 1979), overruled on other grounds, Moradi-Shalal v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988). Royal Globe sets forth the California Insurance
Code provision as follows:
Section 790.03 provides in part: 'The following are hereby defined as unfair methods
of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
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enforcement provisions 73 require aggrieved consumers to seek relief in an
administrative rather than in a judicial forum.
To date, a careful reading of settlement-practice provisions among the
states reveals that various administrative enforcement mechanisms and sanc-
tions are highly inadequate. In most states, the insurance commissioner has
sole discretion to investigate alleged violations of claims-settlement provi-
'(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
'(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions
relating to any coverages at issue.
'(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications
with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
'(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investiga-
tion and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
'(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after
proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
'(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
'(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for
amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
'(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or
printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
'(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent,
or broker.
'(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon
request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
'(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compel-
ling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in
arbitration.
'(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then
requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which
submissions contain substantially the same information.
'(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under
other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
'(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in
the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
'(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
'(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.'
Id.
173. See generally, MODEL ACT, supra note 171, at §§ 7(a)-(e), 8(a)-(c).
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sions. '74 Insurance commissioners' enforcement powers, though, are highly
restricted because most states only allow commissioners to issue cease-and-
desist orders after these officers determine that insurers have violated claims-
settlement provisions."' Additionally, insurance commissioners may seek
injunctive relief in state courts and assess modest civil penalties against of-
fending primary carriers.' 7 6
Finally, although most claims-settlement provisions correctly prevent ag-
grieved consumers from initiating private causes of actions against offending
primary insurers, states' administrative procedures do not adequately com-
pensate aggrieved individuals. 177 Legislatures should revise current laws so
that aggrieved consumers have the definitive right to recover both compensa-
tory and punitive awards, if an AL's findings warrant such compensation.
Requiring consumers and insurance companies to resolve their controver-
sies in an administrative forum rather than through litigation is the superior
policy. As this Article has demonstrated, state courts, especially state
supreme courts, are more likely to use litigants' demographic characteristics
rather than sound legal principles to decide insurance-related actions. To
satisfy the reasonable expectations of both consumers and insurance compa-
nies, and to ensure that conflicts are resolved fairly, quickly and on the mer-
its, states must employ significantly larger numbers of administrative law
judges. The expertise of such judges must be more than sufficient to adjudi-
cate a wide variety of insurance-related issues.
States also could establish an effective enforcement strategy similar to the
one created by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).178 States' en-
forcement schemes should differ from the NLRA's in one respect: state
complainants who complain about primary insurers' unfair and deceptive
settlement practices must be barred from obtaining judicial review in either
state or federal courts because extralegal factors, such as race, ethnicity, gen-
der, types of aggrieved persons, complainants' occupational status, and vic-
174. See generally, A.B.A. Bad-Faith Annotations, supra note 171.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See SHERNOFF, supra note 42, at § 6.04[1][c].
178. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988)). Under this Act, both the General Counsel and the National
Labor Relations Board play major roles. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988). However, there is little
reason to structure a state administrative system in which considerable discretion is given to a
general counsel. A three-judge intermediate panel could be established to review administra-
tive law judges' decisions if aggrieved insureds or primary carriers wished to appeal adverse
rulings. And if the intermediate panel's ruling is unfavorable, the losing party could still ap-
peal the action to one of several regional boards with the state. Each regional board would be
comprised of five persons who are both insurance-law specialists and experienced litigators,
and each regional board's decision board would be final.
1992]
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tims' geographic origin, influence outcomes of actions. 179 Arguably, such
unwarranted discriminatory conduct stems, in part, from justices' incompe-
tence and lack of experience in complex areas of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Are state supreme courts truly biased against consumers of insurance
products? Are most courts hostile toward primary insurance carriers? As
this Article has demonstrated, many insurance companies and consumers
believe that judicial bias is rampant in state supreme courts. Apparently,
both insureds' and insurers' opinions have been shaped by conflicting inter-
pretations of dicta appearing in various bad-faith, breach-of-contract,
breach-of-covenant-of-good-faith, and excess-judgment decisions.
On the basis of the findings reported in this Article, state supreme courts
are practicing disparate-impact discrimination, a type of "judicial bias."
These tribunals are unwittingly permitting immaterial evidence to influence
the outcome of bad-faith, breach-of-contract, breach-of-covenant-of good-
faith and excess-liability actions.
State legislatures must establish effective and "unbiased" administrative
enforcement systems to address claims-settlement and other insurance-re-
lated disputes between primary carriers and their insureds. Until such
mechanisms are in place, insureds as well as insurers are likely to remain
victims of disparate-impact discrimination in state supreme courts.
179. See, e.g., Rice, Enforcement Under Labor Acts, supra note 157, at 727-34; Rice, Fair
Housing, supra note 149, at 248-63; Rice, Grove-City Analysis, supra note 157, at 283-96.
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